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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 The puzzle
Elections are excellent means to empower aspiring political groups. For countries
that have experienced internal armed conflicts, first national elections after the end
of conflicts are often crucial parts of the transitional phase in achieving peace and
stability. They are symbolic in marking the end of violence and the beginning of
democratic politics. For this reason, policymakers involved in building sustainable
peace in post-conflict countries often want to hold such elections early (Newman
and Rich, 2004; Carothers, 2007; Reilly, 2002). In the same vein, some scholars
argue that elections in the post conflict context serve as the start of the process of
democratic institutionalization, and they should be held sooner rather than later,
to capitalize the consensus generally seen among the key players during the peace
agreement phase (Lyons, 2004). Analyzing seven post-conflict election (PCE) cases,
for example, Lyons (2004) argues that demilitarization should be the top prior-
ity before holding elections and suggests, “Rather than focusing on creating the
structures necessary to produce ‘free and fair’ elections [emphasis in original], the
international community should look for ways to support interim electoral commis-
sions that foster collaboration among former warring parties, build confidence in
the peace process, and change expectations” (2004:58). Many practitioners share
this view that election held at the right moment can cement the consensus among
parties, thus starting a new phase of democratic stability.
Post conflict elections, however, are not always successful in establishing sus-
tainable democracies. Quite the contrary, past research points to unsuccessful case
1
studies like Liberia and Cambodia, where post-conflict elections exacerbated the
tension and restarted the war (Lyons, 1999). Perplexed by the puzzle, scholars and
policymakers have been focusing on the question: how can elections bring about
a more robust and sustainable democracy in such countries? Three main distinct
approaches have emerged over the years to address this question.
First, an intuitive and feasible approach suggested is the disarmament, demo-
bilization and reintegraiton (DDR) of former combatants before elections. After
studies indicated the positive impacts of DDR (Walter, 1999; Lyons, 2002, 2004),
other studies have contributed further to improve on the procedural efficiency of
conducting DDR (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2005; Phayal, Khadka and Thyne,
2015). As a result, the international community and third parties involved in peace
processes have incorporated DDR as an important part of the peacebuilding project.
In United Nations peacekeeping missions, for instance, DDR strategies have been
widely applied since the beginning of the new millennium and published a man-
ual called the Integrated DDR Standard (IDDRS) in the year 2006, to guide DDR
practitioners world wide (United Nations, 2006). Currently, the UN boosts a sec-
ond generation of DDR best practices (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, 2010) and the initiative is echoed in various regional peacebuilding
missions.
Second, the UN established the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) in 1992 to
support the smooth transitioning of elections.1 The EAD has five key roles, while
still expanding: (a) organization and conduct of elections; (b) verification/certification;
(c) technical assistance; (d) expert panels; and (e) coordination of international ob-
servers.2
1See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/46/137, 9 March 1992
2See General Assembly Resolution A/66/314, 19 August 2011
2
Lastly, scholars have advocated powersharing arrangements like that of Bosnia
and Herzegovina as a part of institutional design to foster peace within divided so-
cieties (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2005; Mattes and Savun,
2009; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008). Although the emphasis to build proportional rep-
resentation (PR) election in divided societies is not new (see Lijphart, 1969), re-
examination of its merits in the context of post-conflict elections is recent. However,
not all agree on the long term benefits of a PR electoral system. On the one hand,
many scholars point that proportional representation and autonomy minimize the
risk of conflicts as minorities in such countries gain a voice in the national politics.
On the other hand, critiques warn against Balkanization, as countries divide into
separate ethnic enclaves and face political gridlock as the number of veto players
increase in national politics (Cunningham, 2011; Horowitz, 1985)3.
Despite the above mentioned approaches, however, we continue to witness chal-
lenges to sustain peace in post-conflict countries. Analyzing all post-civil war cases
after World War II, Brancati and Snyder (2013) find that countries are able to sus-
tain the peace after elections only in about half of the cases. Two examples of suc-
cessful cases are Sierra Leone after its post-conflict election in 2002, and Guatemala
after 1999. Figure 1.1 shows that both countries prospered steadily after the land-
mark event of a post-conflict election. However, many other post-conflict countries
continue to face two main challenges after such elections. First, the level of democ-
racy in the majority of post-conflict countries is sub-optimal, explained partly due
to a low level of political accountability in less successful countries (Gurses and
Mason, 2008). Second, recent research shows that more than half the intra-state
conflicts around the world are a relapse of conflict (Walter, 2004; Doyle and Sam-
3Also see Cox and McCubbins (1997) for debate about the effect of institutional design on policy
outcomes.
3
banis, 2000), and elections are one of the primary causes in increasing the risk
of relapsed conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008; Paris, 2004; Collier,
2003; Cederman, Hug and Krebs, 2010). Some recent examples of such failures
include the restart of armed conflicts in Sri Lanka after 2004 post-conflict elections,
in Democratic Republic of Congo after 2006, in Chad after 2001, in Afghanistan
after 2004, and in Iraq after 2000.
Figure 1.1: Successful Post-conflict Elections
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Note: Above figure depicts GDP per capita of the two countries in constant 2005 USD. The blue
and red colors mark periods after and before post-conflict elections.
Source: World bank.
Recent studies continue to focus on the puzzle of why post-conflict elections fail
to sustain the peace from two different approaches. First, studies point that the
timing of elections has substantive impact on peaceful sustainability later. Flores
and Nooruddin (2012) and Brancati and Snyder (2013) show that post-conflict
countries that hasten elections face the risk of conflict recurrence. This finding is
particularly important in the recent context considering the fact that the length
4
of time between the end of conflict and the first post-conflict election has been
declining in recent decades, from an average of 5.6 years before 1989 to an average
of 2.7 years after 1989 (Brancati and Snyder, 2013, p. 823).
However, as Joshi, Melander and Quinn (2015, p. 5) point out, the finding
about election timing while very illuminating, is not very useful for policymak-
ers. Quite the opposite, all stakeholders on the ground demand elections to be
held sooner rather than later. Moreover, some scholars point out that the early
phase of the post-conflict period is risky irrespective of an election (Collier, Hoeffler
and Söderbom, 2008, p. 464; Snyder, 2000;Collier and Hoeffler,2004). Therefore,
while the finding on election timing may contribute to our understanding of the
failure of post-conflict elections, there is a need to identify other causal factors
associated with elections that disrupt the sustainability of peace in post-conflict
countries.
Joshi, Melander and Quinn (2015) instead suggest focusing on the terms of
Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA). The authors use a bargaining framework
to (1) understand why former warring groups agree to sign peace agreement and
contend elections in the first place, and (2) analyze conditions in which groups
would remain committed to peace after the elections. They argue that provisions
of accommodation as laid out in Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA) signifi-
cantly affect the probability of peaceful sustainment later. According to the authors,
three provisions of accommodation in the CPA that reduce the likelihood of conflict
recurrence are the establishment of a transitional powersharing government, the
granting of amnesty and the release of prisoners of war.
Yet, while accommodative CPA has positive effects, it does not necessarily ad-
dress how post-conflict elections influence the sustainability of peace later. What
5
factors inherent in the electoral process help a post-conflict country transition to-
wards sustainable and peaceful country? This dissertation looks beyond the timing
of election and CPA effects, and examines the role of electoral processes in raising
later the risk levels. In chapter two, for example, I examine citizens’ political at-
titudes with survey data to determine whether fear among voters influences their
voting patterns. The main argument is that fear of violence causes people to vote
for parties that are less moderate and more violent, which in turn contributes to the
increased risk of conflict recurrence after an election. Empirically, a factor that cre-
ates variation in the levels of fear among voters in such elections is the presence or
absence of pre-election intimidation and violence. The main findings in this study
indicate that presence of pre-election violence increases support for violent parties,
and also the risk of conflict recurrence. In summary, I argue that in post-conflict
countries, pre-election intimidation fuels the cycle of violence, as fearful voters are
more likely to support parties that have the potential to restart the armed conflict.
The dissertation contributes to our understanding of the short and long term
consequences of election violence in post conflict regions. Despite the conviction of
both policymakers and academics that elections are the primary means to manage
conflict, our understanding of why they do not always maintain peace in post-
conflict countries is limited. Weak institutions are often cited as the reason for fail-
ures of post-conflict elections; and, therefore, the recommendation is made to build
strong institutions before holding elections, often with the help of outside actors,
(Paris, 2004; Paris and Sisk, 2008; Brancati and Snyder, 2013). Yet, an election
is the foundational event in building political institutions. Thus, the recommen-
dation, while undoubtedly valid, needs to be much more specific. This research
contributes by revealing the mechanisms by which violence affects the voting be-
6
havior of individuals, the outcome of elections and ultimately, the sustainability of
peace
The main results show that the presence of pre-election violence has debilitat-
ing effects on electoral democracy and post-conflict peace. This is important be-
cause the level of pre-election violence, according to this study, need not be large
to produce such effects. Perceptions of insecurity among voters, caused by some
incidents of intimidations, are enough to drive the path of electoral democracy in a
post-conflict country to what Ashworth, de Mesquita and Friedenberg (2015) term
a sub-optimal democracy, and eventually to the failure of peace.
This research also has important implications for policymakers that are inter-
ested in building peace and democracy in post-conflict countries. In her book on
election monitoring, Kelley (2012, p. 72) shows that international election mon-
itors tend to under-report pre-election violence due to what she refers to as the
“stability bias”—fear among election-monitoring bodies that reporting pre-election
violence may fuel instability and protests in the country. While those fears are prob-
ably genuine, findings from this study highlight that such underreporting systemat-
ically affects the health of democracy in the long run. Considering the challenges,
therefore, one policy recommendation from this study is to focus on deterring po-
litical parties from using in coercive strategies, by imposing layers of direct and
indirect costs. As suggested in the final chapter, I highlight the need and collec-
tive responsibility of external peacebuilders, election monitors and civil society in
providing a sense of security among voters in post-conflict countries.
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1.2 The Roadmap
There are three main empirical essays that follow to demonstrate that pre-election
violence increases the recurrence of armed conflict in post-conflict elections. Fol-
lowing the introductory chapter, the essay in chapter two examines how the fear
of violence leads mass publics to adopt anti-democratic orientations. Using psycho-
logical theories, I argue that individuals fearing violence are more likely to form
political opinions based on their fears and insecurities. They are therefore more
inclined to prioritize anti-democratic values, such as maintaining order, respect for
authority, and the need for a stronger leader, over democracy and liberty. As evi-
dence to support the argument, I analyze sixth wave World Values Survey dataset of
more than 60,000 respondents in 52 countries, using multi-level modeling. The re-
sults show that when respondents perceive higher threats from war, civil war, or ter-
rorism, they are more supportive of undemocratic leaders. Furthermore, I explore
whether actual threats of violence generate similar effects on individual attitudes
by investigating the provincial level violence in Iraq and its influence on the public
opinion. Again using hierarchical models, I find that Iraqis living in provinces with
greater conflict report higher levels of anti-democratic attitudes.
In the third chapter essay, I link the above findings to the electoral context of
post-conflict countries. I argue that political parties in post-conflict countries are
likely to gain more votes through the use of pre-election violence and intimidation.
When parties are seen to use intimidation and indiscriminate violence, it intensifies
voters’ worries about conflict recurring. Fearing that the violent party may restart
armed conflict upon losing the election, citizens become risk averse and vote for
the violent party. I test this argument by analyzing results of Nepal’s post-conflict
elections in 2008 and the documented incidents of pre-election violence and in-
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timidation by a former rebel party. As expected, regression analyses show that the
former rebel party received more votes in districts where it used a higher level of
pre-election violence.
In chapter four, I focus on the long term implications of voter intimidation in
post-conflict countries. Following the second chapter where I argue that violent
parties are likely to win elections with pre-election violence, I expect to find a strong
association between voter intimidation incidents and the increased risk of renewed
conflicts. Electoral victory through violent means causes opposing parties to not
only challenge the electoral results but also question the winner’s commitment to
peace. Winners, on the other hand, are reluctant to give up their power and may
even use force to repress challengers. I test this argument about spiraling violence
with a crossnational dataset of post-conflict country-cases from 1950 to 2010. Using
countries as the unit of analysis, I use an event history model to analyze the effects
of pre-election violence on the recurrence of armed conflicts. As expected, the
results show that on average, presence of pre-election violence increases the risk of
conflict recurrence by more than double.
Finally, in the concluding chapter, I discuss the policy implications of the find-
ings. Since I establish in the earlier chapters the negative consequences of voter
insecurity in post-conflict countries, I suggest policy measures in four areas to phys-
ically lower the levels of violent incidents before an election and to send a positive
message to voters for boosting their security perceptions. While these measures ex-
ist as a part of various peacebuilding initiatives, the main emphasis of this chapter
is to consolidate these security-enhancing steps for electoral purposes. The four
main steps that I discuss in the final chapter are (1) disarmament and demobiliza-
tion of ex-combatants before elections, (2) peacebuilding to gear towards civilian
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protection starting at least six months before the election day, (3) strengthening
civil society to exercise accountability, and (4) deploying election monitors early
and making the security challenges early, rather than waiting to declare whether or
not election was fair.
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Chapter 2 The Threat of violence and support for strong leadership
Abstract
Does the fear of violence lead citizens to adopt anti-democratic ori-
entations? Past studies on this topic focus primarily on consolidated
democracies, despite its greater relevance for democratizing countries.
In this study, I use the sixth wave World Values Survey data from 53
countries to examine how the degree to which citizens are worried about
political violence—from war, civil war and terrorism—shapes their vari-
ous undemocratic orientations. I argue that when fearful of political vi-
olence, citizens face competing choices between security versus liberty.
The results show that citizens expressing greater apprehension about
political violence are more supportive of maintaining order, respect for
authority, and strong leadership over democratic governance. Further
investigation shows that individuals experiencing “actual” threat of vio-
lence also express similar preferences. These findings provide a deeper
understanding of mass political behavior during violent periods, with
important implications for scholars and policymakers about the need
to allay individual insecurities in order to effectively build sustainable
democratic institutions.
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2.1 Introduction
“You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your
meadows and gardens. Your memories. You shouldn’t abandon your
land because it’s difficult to live, because you are pressured by injustice
and degradation . . . . You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors
and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled and de-
scendants disappointed. But I don’t suggest that you stay, endure, and
tolerate a situation you are not satisfied with.”
Milosovic’s speech to serbs in Kosovo (Silber and Little, 1996, p. 39)
A handful of studies highlights the role of political leaders in creating a climate
of hostility, anger and aggression among the public. When Milosovic rose to power
in Serbia, for instance, his speeches were bellicose, calling Serbs to fight and defend
themselves against the other ethnic groups in the region, which later turned into
an ethnic bloodbath. Some argue that entrepreneurial leaders like Milosovic are
strategic in their decisions to mobilize radical movements and violence, as they
wait for the opportune transitional periods (Pappas, 2008; Mansfield and Snyder,
2005, p. 10). Leaders, in other words, are key in shaping intolerant attitudes among
citizens, often increasing the risk of conflict and the failure of nascent democracies.
Another set of studies, however, indicates that rather than the behavior of lead-
ers, it is the fear among individuals that rallies the masses towards leaders that
are aggressive, intolerant and undemocratic. Analyzing electoral patterns in post-
conflict countries, Flores and Nooruddin (2012, p. 561) suggest that many voters in
post-conflict elections are likely to elect “insincere candidates.” The authors use the
example of Liberian post-conflict election in 1997 to illustrate their point. Liberian
voters at the time elected Charles Taylor and his violent National Patriotic Front
of Liberia (NPLF) party. According to the authors, the Liberians discarded moder-
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ate and peaceful candidate and favored Taylor’s NPLF party because they feared
that the party would restart the armed conflict if they lost the election.1 When
Milosovic was campaigning to get elected, Serbia was in a similar transitional state.
Yugoslavia had just disintegrated and tension was building among Serbs and Croats
in the region. Amidst this tension, 86% of the Serbian population voted for Miloso-
vic in a referendum-type election in December 1989. In both cases, citizens chose
an aggressive political strongman, who were later indicted as war criminals. In
this chapter, I examine these debates by focusing on the sense of insecurity among
citizens and its effect on their democratic attitudes and preferences. Does fear of
violence increase anti-democratic tendencies among individuals?
The main argument of the chapter is that when individuals fear the prospect
of violence, they are more likely to prioritize security and protection, and show
relatively less concern for liberty and democracy. To test the argument, I analyze
democratic attitudes of individuals as they report the degree of their perceived fear
of violence,2 using World Values Survey (WVS) dataset of more than 60,000 indi-
viduals across 53 countries. The empirical tests strongly support the premise that
apprehensions about political violence from wars, civil wars and terrorism causes
individuals to prefer political order over liberty, to value respect for authority more
than independence, and to show more support for strong candidates even at the
cost of democracy. Furthermore, I also examine if an individual’s democratic atti-
tude is influenced by the varying levels of actual violence they experience. To assess
the effect of threat from actual violence, I analyze survey responses of Iraqi citizens
in 2004 and 2006, living in 18 Iraqi provinces that suffered varying degrees of vi-
1Also see Lyons (1999)
2I use fear from violence and threat from violence interchangeably to mean individual’s attitu-
dinal response to the prospect of armed violence (war, civil war, terrorism).
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olence because of the ongoing civil war. Results show that individuals are more
likely to report the need for stronger leaders and prioritize political order, when
they have experienced a higher intensity of violence.
The chapter contributes to our understanding about the risk to democratic sur-
vival that many young democracies face as voters embrace anti-democratic pref-
erences. Insights from this crossnational study are generalizable and useful to
policymakers in transitional countries, as well as the international community with
interests in building sustainable democracies. It highlights the vulnerability of citi-
zens to populist and bellicose rhetorics, when a country is facing threats from armed
violence. Independent of elite manipulation, this study suggests that individuals be-
come more inclined to support strong and anti-democratic leaders when they are
fearful. The findings are particularly relevant for post-conflict countries on the path
to democratization, where fear of violence is widespread.
In the following section, I briefly survey past works that show the effect of politi-
cal context on public support for democracy. The discussion that follows culminates
to the three main hypotheses of the study predicting that perceiving the threat of
violence leads citizens to place a greater emphasis on the need for order and re-
spect for authority, and to support a strong leader who does not have to bother
with elections. The empirical section that follows uses multi-level models to ana-
lyze WVS data of individual responses nested within country characteristics. The
second part of the empirical section examines the survey responses of citizens in
Iraqi provinces. Since provinces in Iraq suffered varying degree of violence around
the time of survey, and since their characteristics differ in terms of sectarian domi-
nance, I once again use a multi-level modeling approach. Finally, I conclude with a
brief discussion of issues that warrant consideration in future investigations.
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2.2 Democratic attitudes under the threat of violence
Studies of mass support for democracy increasingly focus on the effect of country-
level factors that shape micro-level attitudes. A central tenet of an ideal democracy
is accountability, which is intricately linked to fair electoral competition and the
ability of citizens to project their material interest in guarding their liberty (Kap-
stein and Converse, 2008, p. 20). Although the mechanism seems to function effi-
ciently once an electoral process is introduced, the underlying complexity becomes
apparent when we look at countries that fail to democratize. Past research indicates
that two structural factors in young democracies are responsible for such failure:
lack of economic development (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) and
weak democratic institutions (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002).
While the debate about the structural factors continues (Boix and Stokes, 2003;
Boix, 2011; Svolik, 2008; Ramsay, 2011), other studies analyze an important micro-
level determinant of a functioning democracy, the voting behavior of individual
citizens (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000; Dalton,
2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Anderson and Singer, 2008). These studies ex-
amine the structural and contextual factors that influence individual political at-
titudes, which ultimately shape the quality of democracy. Using survey sample
of population from Eastern European countries, for instance, Evans and Whitefield
(1995) show that rather than evaluation of economic performance, our experiences
with political institutions influence our commitment to democracy. Others counter-
argue and attribute democratic failures to the clientelistic culture predominant in
young democracies that prompt citizens to distrust political leaders and turn to-
wards patronage networks, thus impinging on healthy competition and democratic
efficiency (Kapstein and Converse, 2008; Keefer, 2007).
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But the most common context that adversely affects the democratization pro-
cess in young democracies is internal armed conflict, either ongoing, eminent, or
the one that occurred in the immediate past (Collier, 2003). Studies couched in
a rational choice framework use the instrumentalist account suggesting the role of
leaders in mobilizing such conflicts. Explaining ethnic conflicts, De Figueiredo and
Weingast (1999, p. 264) argue that the security dilemma among citizens alone can-
not explain the onset of conflicts; the role and incentive of the leaders is important.
In their review article on ethnic conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2000, p. 846) similarly
state that “large-scale ethnic violence is provoked by elites seeking to gain, main-
tain or increase their hold on political power.” Such mobilizations form cleavages
in society along ethnic or ideological lines, often leading to the initiation of either
armed violence or the electoral ascendancy of militaristic leaders, thus undermin-
ing democratic processes. In other words, a major cause of democratic failures in
countries with weak political institutions is the onset of armed conflict through elite
manipulation.
However, others do not fully agree with the instrumentalist view. Sambanis
(2002, p. 228) finds the instrumentalist argument problematic since it “suggests
that ethnic conflict is not inherent in ethnic identity.” The author takes the pri-
mordialist approach to explain ethnic conflicts, as suggested by Horowitz (1985).
Rather than an elite driven process, the primordialist approach contends that eth-
nic conflicts are manifestations of innate human tendencies to divide along ethnic
or tribal lines. Sambanis (2002, p. 228) accepts that “There is still much work
to be done linking macro-level theories of conflict to a theoretical treatment of in-
dividuals motives and actions.” Varshney (2003) similarly argues that individuals
are drawn to nationalistic wars because of other aspects like self-respect, dignity
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and recognition. In sum, the latter works suggest that even without elite manipula-
tion, there are emotional and innate factors that can trigger the ingroup-outgroup
mentality that is conducive to conflict.
Behavioral studies suggest that contextual or structural factors can also shape
our political attitudes. This role of context on our political attitudes is different
from the elite-focused instrumentalist argument, and also from the primordialist
or purely emotion-based arguments discussed above, which regards emotions as
fixed. Mansfield and Snyder allude to this contextual effect on individual attitudes
when the authors posit, “It is not fixed public attitudes of belligerence, but rather
something in the political process of the transition itself that turns attitude and out-
comes in a warlike direction” (2005, p. 22). More recent studies have undertaken
empirical investigations to identify unique psychological patterns among individu-
als during unusual contexts, such as transitions or other external shocks like the fall
of Berlin wall (Rohrschneider, 1999) or the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Research conducted after the 9/11 attacks, for instance, shows that an increased
threat perception among citizens leads to more support for the war against ter-
rorism (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Huddy and Feldman, 2011), the increased
willingness to trade off personal liberty for security and support for leaders and par-
ties that are conservative, nationalist, and ready to adopt punitive policies against
terrorists (Davis and Silver, 2004; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009b,a). These US
findings seem generalizable to other consolidated democracies, such as Israel (Berrebi
and Klor, 2008), where terrorist incidents even in politically left-leaning localities
produced an increase in support for right bloc parties; or in Turkey, where attacks
by PKK rebel groups had similar results (Kibris, 2010). Drawing largely from psy-
chological theories, Merolla and Zechmeister (2009a) argue that when individuals
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face terrorist threats, coping mechanisms lead to three distinct behavioral reactions:
increased distrust and intolerance, preference for strong leadership during voting
decisions, and support for aggressive foreign policy.3
However, the above findings, that fear leads to preference for strong leaders,
are based on research on consolidated democracies. “Strong” in the studies refer to
leaders that have the capability to pursue punitive policies or war against terrorism.
Much less is known on how fear of violence may affect political attitudes of citizens
in a democratizing country, or its consequence on the democratic process. The lat-
ter is important because in contrast to minor democratic backsliding in consolidated
democracies, the reversal of a democratic regime is a real possibility for a democra-
tizing country. Alternatively, it is plausible that people in Western democracies favor
stronger leaders as a rational response, if they are confident in the ability of such
a leader to fight terrorism, while assured that such support alone will not result
in a democratic reversal. In any case, understanding contextual factors that shape
democratic attitudes among citizens is important for a democratizing country and
there is a need to examine the association between the threat of violence and the
democratic choices of the public across countries with varying degree of democracy
based on relevant theoretical underpinnings.
2.3 Fear of violence and the choice of order, authority and strong leader
When individuals prefer more political order over civil liberty and endorse respect
for authority, studies indicate that their political attitudes tend to run counter to
democratic principles. Gibson (2013) finds that a person’s choice of political order
3As fear of terrorist violence increases among citizens, studies show that the level of stereotyp-
ing and intolerance also become higher (Kinder and Kam, 2010; Davis and Silver, 2004; Peffley,
Hutchison and Shamir, 2015)
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over civil liberties is linked to political intolerance.4 Stenner, in her study about
authoritarian dispositions, similarly argues that political intolerance is one of the
four components of authoritarianism (2005, p. 23) and shows that a person’s choice
for political order over civil liberties reflects political intolerance. The author points
to studies about the rise of radical right wing populist parties in Europe that found
a high degree of political intolerance among party supporters.5
Similarly, an individual’s choice of respect for authority is found to be closely
linked with social conformity (Stenner, 2005, p. 148) and negatively related to
the tolerance of opposing views. Empirically, Inglehart (1999) finds after analyzing
time series WVS data that over the years, there is a decline in responses indicating
that “respect for authority is good” and this decline negatively correlated with the
gradual increase in support for democracy. In this section, I analyze the impact
of fear on respondents’ democratic attitudes by examining their choices on main-
taining order and respect for authority, when they report varying degree of threat
perception.
What is our reaction to fear? Psychological studies explain that our need for
order and respect for authority become more acute when we feel the lack of phys-
ical security in our surroundings. This is because our perceptions about threats to
personal safety and security are closely linked to how we think about and make
political decisions. Studies on terror management theory posit that culture and
cultural norms serve as anxiety-buffers when people are confronted with threats to
their mortality. Under normal conditions, humans are in denial about their mortal-
ity. But when mortality is made salient, humans seek solace and a sense of order
4Gibson (2013, p. 46) defines political tolerance as “whether citizens will put up with objection-
able political ideas—the degree to which citizens will support the extension of civil liberties to all,
including groups advocating highly disagreeable viewpoints and ideologies”
5also see (Altemeyer, 1981)
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and permanence by bolstering our cultural values, such as religious views or dog-
matic political views (Rosenblatt et al., 1989, 681).6
Studies after 9/11 shifted the focus from normative threats to terrorist threats,
as they find that the perception of terrorist threats increased intolerance and ha-
treds against outgroups and support for punitive measures such as the “war against
terrorism” (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Asbrock and Fritsche, 2013; Napier
and Jost, 2008; Duckitt, 2013). Because armed violence, be it from war, civil war
or terrorism, evokes similar concerns about safety and security, we should find that
when people are fearful of armed violence, the importance for maintaining order
and security should prevail over civil liberties and individual freedom. Likewise,
such fears should necessitate the demand for more social conformity and therefore,
respect for authority.
H1: Citizens who perceive greater threat from war, civil war and terrorism are
expected to express greater support for order (H1a) and respect for authority (H1b),
independent of other individual level and country level characteristics.
Studies show that threat perception creates in-group out-group boundaries, gen-
erates intolerance towards the “other,” and increases support for powerful leaders
who can punish the out-groups. According to Greenberg and Arndt (2011), such
reaction is the result of the primal instinct to survive. Revisiting our discussion
about normative threat, psychological studies show that mortality salience is linked
to self-preservation by upholding cultural and moral values. Rosenblatt and his
colleagues (1989, p. 688) state, “Those who deviate from cultural standards are
6Terror management theory is linked to Fromm (1941), who argues that German citizens after
the first World War adopted authoritarian ideology as a result of threats to German values. These
earlier psychological studies defined threat normatively—perceiving threat to existence when indi-
vidual’s norms and cultural values are threatened (Fromm, 1941; Rosenblatt et al., 1989).
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responded to with disdain because such behavior threatens the values that underlie
the individual’s source of security.” Furthermore, Greenberg et al. (1990) use ex-
perimental evidence to show that activating death-related cognition causes a person
to evaluate others positively and reward them when they agree with the person’s
cultural world views, and to evaluate them negatively and punish them when they
transgress the person’s world views or values. This explanation indicates that in-
dividual’s instinctive response to threat perception not only heightens their intoler-
ance against outgroups but also increases their endorsement of aggressive leaders.
The international relations literature on ethnic conflict and polarization use a
rationalist framework and provide a slightly nuanced explanation for why fear from
another group or person causes individuals to manifest prosocial behavior among
in-group members and punish the out-group. Founded on classic inter-state conflict
theories, Posen (1993, p. 28-29) argues that individuals show aggressive behavior
towards a group that they perceive as hostile, mainly due to the superiority of
offensive action against defensive action. Similarly, Horowitz (1985, p. 187) argues
that fear of ethnic domination and suppression to be the primary reason to acquire
a more powerful position. In Rwanda, for instance, Kaufman (2006) argues that
the fear of domination is one of the main factors that fueled the conflict between
Hutus and Tutsis in the 1990s. When Hutu President Habyarimana agreed to start
a dialogue with Tutsis, the extremist northwestern Hutu clique viewed it as an
abject surrender to the Tutsis, who in their view, “would seize the spoils of their
rule and seek retribution” (Kuperman, 2000, p. 96). Although the perpetrator who
fired and brought down the President’s airplane has remained mysterious, it is clear
that the fearful Hutus were in favor of a more aggressive policy towards the Tutsis
and were not happy about the President’s approach to start a peaceful dialog. In
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other words, as Kalyvas (2006, p. 61) argues, individuals are more supportive of a
“warmongering” leader when they are fearful and uncertain about the opponent’s
intention to harm physically. When people are fearful of armed violence, I therefore
expect them to support leaders that are strong and aggressive, with little regard for
the democratic process.7
H2: Individuals who perceive greater threat from war, civil war and terrorism
should be more supportive of strong political leaders.
2.4 Research design
I test the above hypotheses using data from the sixth wave of the WVS (World
Values Survey Association, 2014) administered cross-nationally between the years
2010 and 2014. In total, there are 61,548 observations nested within 53 countries.
Considering the country-level variations, I use multi-level modelling approach to
explore how fear of violence, perceived or real, affects the anti-democratic attitudes
among respondents.
2.4.1 Dependent Variables
The expectation in this chapter is that perceived threat from war, civil war and ter-
rorism influences individuals’ expressed support for undemocratic attitudes—i.e.,
order, respect for authority, and strong leadership. I use three batteries of questions
from the WVS to measure undemocratic attitudes, the dependent variables in the
7I do not differentiate the anger and anxiety response from distinctive threat and fear stimuli
(Huddy, Feldman and Weber, 2007). This is because theoretically I expect both responses to result
in support for extremist leaders—for a extremist nationalist leader when angry, or comply with
the perpetrator’s demand when filled with anxiety, thus providing support for, say, a coercive rebel
group. In both cases, there is no room for moderate and peaceful candidate. Electoral defeat of
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to
Charles Taylor during the 1997 in Liberia is a good anecdotal example for the latter.
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analysis. First, a question asks respondents to select a response that they think is
the most important from among the following list: maintaining order, giving people
more say in important government decisions, fighting rising prices, and protecting
freedom of speech. I create a binary variable maintaining order coded as 1 if “main-
taining order” was the respondent’s first choice and 0 otherwise.8 Another question
in the WVS asks whether respondents think greater respect for authority is “good,”
“bad” or they “don’t mind”. The resulting variable respect for authority is coded 1
if respondents think it is good and 0 otherwise.9 Finally, the third question asks re-
spondents about their preference for “a strong leader who does not have to bother
with parliament and elections.” The variable strong leader is coded 1 if respondents
choose having such leader is “very good” or “fairly good” and 0 if they choose “fairly
bad” or “very bad”. 10I model individual variables nested within country character-
istic variables to explain the three dependent variables as below.
Country level: Model for country j
β00 = γ00 + γ01(GDP (log)) + γ02(Polity)
Random intercept: Model for individuals i’s nested within country j’s :
Dependent Variable11ij = γ00 + γ01(GDP (log) + γ02(Polity) + β01(Threat index)+
β02(Gender : m - 1, f - 0) + β03(Age) + β04(Education level) + β05(Income)+
β06(Predisposed authoritarianism) + u0j + εji
8 WVS Quesiton: “If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is
most important? Maintaining order in the nation; Giving people more say in important government
decisions; Fighting rising prices and; Protecting freedom of speech.”
9 WVS Quesiton: ”Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would
be a good thing, a bad thing, or don’t you mind? Greater respect for authority”
10 WVS Question: “For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or
very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with
parliament and elections”
11Need for order, respect for authority and strong leader
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2.4.2 Individual level explanatory and control variables
Using WVS data, I use self-reported threat perception or fear from violence as the
main explanatory variable. Three questions in the survey asks respondents how
much they worry about war, civil war and terrorism on a 4-point scale: “very much,”
“a good deal,” “not much,” or “not at all.” While responses to these questions tap
different events in different countries, theoretically it is safe to state that they all
measure the same latent concept: their perception of threat or fear from armed
violence. Using principal component factor analysis, I find that the factor loadings
for all three items are above .9. I then create a factor index of the three items
that ranges from 1 (“no threat” ) to 12 (“highest level of threat”). The factor in-
dex variable that reports individual’s level of fear from violence, threat index, has
eigenvalue of 2.59.
Numerous other factors may influence the degree to which respondents express
their democratic attitudes. Past research, for example, shows that we are more
likely to find anti-democratic attitudes and lower support for civil liberties among
individuals who are pre-disposed to authoritarianism (Feldman and Stenner, 1997;
Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). Following past studies (Feldman and Stenner,
1997; Duckitt, 1989), I use child rearing values to measure predisposed authoritar-
ianism among individuals. A question in the WVS asks respondents to pick from a
list of qualities in children that they think are important. Individuals who choose
obedience as the most important value in children from a list of 11 possible values
are coded as pre-disposed authoritarians.12
Education is also an important determinant of democratic attitudes. Thyne
12The other choices are independence; hard work; feeling of responsibility; imagination; toler-
ance and respect for other people; thrift, saving money and things; determination, perseverance;
religious faith; unselfishness; and self-expression.
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(2006) argues that education contributes to political stability by creating social
cohesion and increasing tolerance. Other studies have also found education level
to correlate positively with tolerance, which in turn is associated with democratic
attitudes (Bobo and Licari, 1989; Stubager, 2008).13 Therefore, I control for the
level of education of the respondents using an ordinal scale that ranges from 1 (no
formal education) to 9 (university level education). Finally, I include in the model
the gender, age and income level of the respondents from the WVS data. Vari-
able female is coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. Finally, age is measured with
continuous scales, and income level is the self-reported household income-group of
respondents in ordinal scale that ranges from lowest of 1 to highest of 10.
Individuals are nested within countries. We find that the sample of countries
in the survey are fairly varied in terms of their regime types and wealth. I use
the polity scale of the country to indicate their regime types: -10 for autocratic
regimes and 10 for the countries with consolidated democracies (Marshall, Jaggers
and Gurr, 2002). The pooled sample distribution of Polity scores shows that 27%
of the countries are below the Polity score of 1, 19% are between 1 and 6, and 54%
are 7 or higher. This sample distribution is fairly representative of the population.
In 2012, for instance, polity data shows that 49% of the countries worldwide had
polity score of 7 or higher. This is reassuring since the second level units need not
necessarily be large and normally distributed (Greene, 2011, p. 183). Finally, I
control for the log of the country’s GDP using data from World Bank (2013). In the
pooled sample, GDP (log) ranges from 1 to 8.
If we are to assume that unobserved characteristics of residents in each coun-
try are constant, then I could use a pooled model of the responses using logit or
13See also Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) on tolerance and democracy.
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probit models. However, since we expect variability among countries even when
controlling for basic indicators like wealth or regime type, I can either use a fixed
or random effects model. Scholars argue that using fixed effects, a dummy variable
for countries, assumes high variability and ignores some similarities across coun-
tries that may be due to factors like shared borders or regions. Using a random
intercept or partial pooling model produce estimates that are closer to population
parameters (Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 353).14 The estimates for the multi-level
model in this study is computed using the lme4 package (version 1.1-12) in R.
2.5 Analysis and results
The main argument in this chapter is that perceived or actual fear of violence in-
fluences political preferences. In order to test this relationship, I first examine the
distribution of the main explanatory variable, perceived threat, and its bivariate
relationship with the three dependent variables measuring undemocratic attitudes.
The main independent variable, the index of self-reported threat or fear levels,
ranges from 3 to 12. The mean threat index for each country in the study and its
relationship with Polity and GDP is shown in Figure 2.1. The shades in the panels
of the figure represent (a) polity scales and (b) GDP (log). According to the figure,
Tunisia has the highest mean threat index of 11.67 for the survey year 2013, and
Netherlands has the lowest value of 3.78 for the survey year 2012. We find that on
average, respondents in wealthy consolidated democracies perceive relatively less
threat from violence.
What is the association between respondents’ threat perception and their demo-
cratic preferences? Bivariate analysis of the sample in Figure 2.2 shows the distri-
14Also see Clark and Linzer (2012)
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Figure 2.1: Mean self-reported threat of violence index in sampled countries
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Note: Figures in both panels above show mean level of self-reported threat index among 64,0033 re-
spondents in 53 countries in the World Values Survey dataset. Threat index is created from questions
in the survey data that asks respondents how much they worry about war, civil war and terrorism.
The threat index ranges from 3 to 12. In the above figure the highest mean index is 11.67 in Tunisia
and the lowest mean index is 3.78 in Netherlands. In panel (a), the darker shades represents au-
tocratic regime along polity scales and in panel (b), darker shades represents poorer countries as
measured by their GDP. In general, above figure shows higher level mean index among respondents
in less democratic and poorer countries.
bution of attitudinal responses for different levels of threat perception. Note that
the y-axis in all three panels are percentages rather than frequencies. For instance,
in the left-most panel of the figure, 2610 individuals report threat index of level
three. Among these, 64.2% report that the need for order is not important, com-
pared to 35.8% respondents that report it as important. As the threat level in the
x-axis increases, I find that the proportion of respondents that value the need for
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Figure 2.2: Threat from violence and support for authority
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Note: The figure above depicts bivariate analysis of mean self-reported threat of violence and three
dependent variables: mainting order, respect for authority and support for strong leader who does
not have to bother with parliament or election. (n=64,000) Source: World values survey
order also becomes higher. In the center panel of the figure, I similarly find that
the proportion of respondents endorsing “respect for authority” increases with the
threat index in x-axis, while the proportion of those that do not like respect for
authority decreases. Finally, in the right-most panel of figure 2.2, I find increased
support for strong undemocratic leaders among individuals that perceive higher
threat levels from armed violence. While these bivariate results show support for
the three hypotheses, it is hard to conclude about such associations from bivariate
analyses alone. In the following, I use multilevel modeling to test the relationship
between x and y, that can also control for numerous other confounding factors at
individual and contextual levels.
Table 2.1 presents the results of multi-level logit models estimated using lme4
package in R, version 1.1-12. To reiterate, my objective is to estimate the effects
of threat perception on individuals’ anti-democratic orientation. The header rows
in the table display the three main dependent variables of the models. Models 1,
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Table 2.1: Crossnational survey on the effect of threat on democratic attitude
Maintain Order Respect for Authority Strong Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual level
Threat index 0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education 0.01 0.01∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Predisposed auth 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Country level
GDP (log) −0.23∗∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.33∗ −0.29∗ −0.05 −0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Polity −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.03 −0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(Intercept) 1.64∗ 1.23 3.47∗∗ 2.71∗ 0.51 −0.04
(0.65) (0.64) (1.31) (1.33) (1.22) (1.20)
AIC 78062 77987 70400 70161 72439 72318
BIC 78143.06 78077.67 70480.74 70251.19 72519.58 72407.59
Num. obs. 61548 61548 60817 60817 59150 59150
Countries 53 53 53 53 53 53
Var: Country 0.22 0.21 0.90 0.92 0.77 0.75
Model compare 78.07∗∗∗ 248.15∗∗∗ 125.93∗∗∗
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Note: Table above shows the effect of self-reported threat from violence—war, civil
war and terrorism— on anti-democratic orientation. For each of the three dependent
variables, the two sets of models depict a significant increase in model fit, as shown
by the last column in the table, when the main explanatory variable is included in the
models.
3 and 5 are the baseline models without the main explanatory variables, mainly
for model comparison after adding the main explanatory variable, threat index.
Examining the AIC and BIC scores reported at the end of the table, smaller scores
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for the full models suggest a better fit after adding the main explanatory variable.
In addition, chi square values in the full models show similarly that adding threat
index significantly improves the model fit in all three cases.
The variable threat index has positive coefficients in all three models, suggest-
ing that as self-reported threat level becomes higher, individuals are more likely to
endorse support for order, respect for authority and the need for strong leader who
does not have to bother with parliament and elections. Marginal effects of models
2, 4 and 6 are shown in figure 2.3. According to the figure, when an individual’s
perception of threat level rises from 1 to 12, we find, on average, the need for main-
taining order increases by approximately 6 percent, respect for authority increases
by 12 percent, and support for strong leadership increases by 12 percent, control-
ling for other variables in the model. Substantively, interpreting these results with
predicted probabilities provides a clearer picture of how change in threat perception
affects the outcome. When threat perception level increases from 3 (25th percentile
in the pooled data) to 12 (75th percentile in the pooled data), I find that need for
maintaining order increases from 37.6% to 47.9%, respect for authority increases
from 59.5% to 69.03%, and the support for strong leader increases from 39.5% to
46.6%, when all variables are held at global mean, and among females and pre-
disposed authoritarians,15. These are significant increases. However, lets look at
two countries for a more realistic estimates of the threat index: Uzbekistan and
Tunisia. If threat level increases from the level of Uzbekistan (6.3) to the level of
Tunisia (11.66), I find that need for order increases from 39.5% to 42.7%, respect
for authority increases from 63.1% to 68.7%, and the support for strong leader
increases from 42.2% to 46.4%, when other control variables are at held global
15I use merTools in R, version 0.2.1, to calculate the predicted probabilities
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mean, and among females and pre-disposed authoritarians. The results hold true
when I replace the aggregate threat index with individual response on worry about
war, civil war or terrorism. In other words, I find strong evidence in support of the
main argument that individuals that perceive higher level of threat from violence
are likely to display higher degree of anti-democratic orientation.16
Figure 2.3: Substantive effects
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Note: Predicted probabilities on how threat index affects dependent variables in table 1
Other variables in the models are generally in the expected direction. In congru-
ence with past studies, pre-disposed authoritarians are more likely to show support
for more order, respect for authority and strong leadership. The country level indi-
cator GDP has negative coefficients in all models but is statistically significant only
for the first two dependent variables. This suggests that on average, citizens in
wealthy countries, are less likely to manifest anti-democratic attitudes. The vari-
able polity has negative coefficient in all but the last model, and is significant only
for the first dependent variable. Education is positive and significant in model 2,
suggesting that educated individuals are more likely to choose maintaining order
16Using squared-age to examine a potential non-linear relationship between age and dependent
variable does not change the main results.
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as important. However, this variable is negative and significant in model 4 and 6,
with a coefficient value in the last model much higher compared to the other two.
This suggests a highly negative association between education level and support for
strong and non-democratic leaders. In sum, we find that individual threat percep-
tion and predisposed authoritarianism positively explain a person’s anti-democratic
attitude whereas more educated individuals and those living in wealthy countries
do not show such preference for strong leaders or respect for authority.
2.6 Actual threat of violence and anti-democratic orientation: The Iraqi case
The analysis above suggests that individual attitude is affected by self-reported “per-
ceived” threat or fear from violence. It does not tell us whether or not citizens living
in conflict-prone contexts—those facing “actual” threats—are likely to show simi-
lar political preferences. Estimating this effect with the crossnational WVS data
is difficult due to two main reasons. First, the sample of countries in the WVS
dataset generally does not include high conflict zones due to physical risks involved
in conducting survey in such environments. Second, there are few countries in
the WVS sixth wave dataset that are categorized as armed conflicts in the Armed
Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002).17 Yet, rather than widespread conflicts,
most countries categorized as conflicts had ongoing territorial conflicts mainly on
the fringes. The effects are therefore limited only to certain hot spots, which makes
it difficult to capture using country-wide random sampling. For example, while In-
dia is coded as an armed-conflict country during the year of survey, the three main
conflicts around the time of survey were Kashmir conflict, conflict in the northeast
17Following countries in WVS-6 are categorized as armed conflict countries, with 25 or more
battle-related deaths in the survey year: India, Rwanda, Yemen, Philippines, Azerbaijan, Nigeria,
Iraq & Pakistan.
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region (Bodoland and Garoland) and the Maoist insurgency in the central region of
Chhattisgarh State. According to government data, the Maoist conflict was the most
severe among the three. During the year 2013 and 2014, the state of Chattisgarh,
among the total of 27 Indian states, had the highest fatalities (222 civilians) from
the Maoist conflict. Yet, the conflict in Chhattisgarh is concentrated within just the
three of its 27 districts.18 Therefore, the geographical spread of the conflict is small.
Even when considering all three conflicts in India, the total population of conflict
regions is less than 5 percent of the overall population. Therefore, these localized
conflicts in India are likely to have very small effects, if at all, on the 95% of the
population. The national random sample of 1581 in the WVS is unlikely to capture
the effect of the conflict accurately. Hence, it is hard to capture the contextual effect
in a random effect model with the WVS sixth wave dataset.
One country where violence level was at its peak when WVS was conducting the
survey is Iraq. Wave four and five of the WVS includes two surveys administered in
Iraq in 2004 and 2006. The overall level of armed conflict in the country at the time
was high, but it varied significantly across provinces. Within-country comparison
of individual political attitudes in the context of a large variation in conflict-level
across provinces makes the Iraq study close to natural experiment. Therefore, I test
the above hypotheses using Iraqi data to examine the effect of “actual” threat of
violence, as opposed to the self-reported “perceived” threat. Moreover, because of
the common battery of questionnaires in different waves of WVS, we can closely
replicate the crossnational findings and run similar models in the Iraqi context.
The country-level variables GDP and polity scores are dropped, adding instead the
18Information on the conflict available at the website of Home Ministry of India http://www.
mha.nic.in/naxal_new [Accessed: October 10, 2015]
Another source of data for conflict is http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/
maoist/Assessment/2013/chhattisgarh.htm [Accessed: October 10, 2015]
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population of each province. I also add a few more individual level variables, such
as religious denomination and religiosity, which are the defining characteristics of
the Iraqi provinces. In the following, I will briefly explain the background of Iraq,
before describing the research design.
2.7 Violence level in 2004 and 2006
Iraq experienced the most gruesome violence in its history in 2004 and 2006. The
violence level in 2006 was much higher than in 2004. The dynamics of conflict
also differed significantly. After Saddam Hussein was removed from power in 2003,
conflict in the following year was between the Western forces present in the country
and Saddam’s loyalists, predominantly Sunni sect Muslims in collaboration with
the Al Qaeda. In 2006, however, the first free election had been held in 2005, and
the conflict was primarily among the three religious sects: Shiite, Sunni and the
Kurdish, all competing to fill the power vacuum at regional and national levels.
The Shiite-dominated party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), proposed a united Shiite region towards the south of Baghdad in August
2005 (Visser, 2005). Later, in February 2006, sectarian violence in the country
reached its pinnacle after the Shiite shrine in Samarra was bombed, allegedly by
the Sunnis. This led to a full-fledged civil war not only between the Shiites and
Sunnis, but also between the Kurds and the others in the North. Yet, the level
of violence was not uniform across the 18 provinces. The Shiite-dominated south
and the Sunni-dominated center around Baghdad were much more violent than the
Kurd-dominated northern region. In the following, I analyze how this variation in
provincial violence level affected the political attitude among the residents.
WVS conducted two waves of surveys across the country during these high-
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conflict periods. The first wave was administered to 2525 Iraqi individuals above
the age of 18 years from November 16, 2004 to December 16, 2004. Out of the
total 18 Iraqi governorates or provinces, only 16 were sampled in 2004. The survey
document19 states that the bad security situation in Mosul and the obstruction by
security forces in Dihok prevented surveys in these locations. The second wave
of Iraqi survey lasted from March 22 until April 4, 2006, covering all provinces.
The sample in the latter year consisted of 2880 respondents above the age of 18.
Both surveys are multi-stage probability samples, based on Iraq’s 1997 population
census, and the number of respondents in each province was determined by its
population size as well as the rural-urban divide.
I use two dependent variables for the Iraqi analysis form the WVS dataset:
whether or not maintaining order is important, and approval of strong leader who
does not have to bother with elections and parliament. The variable respect for au-
thority could not be included in the Iraqi analysis because the specific questionnaire
is missing in the Iraqi battery. Measurement of these two dependent variables are
identical to the crossnational study explained above.
To explain the democratic attitude, I model the provincial violence data and in-
dividual level data from the WVS using a multi-level modelling approach. Since
provincial surveys in Iraq in these two years are not panel surveys, I take each
province from both 2004 and 2006 as unique second-level units. Additionally, con-
trol for the two years as explained in the section below.
The main explanatory variable in the Iraqi case is the level of “actual” threat that
individuals experienced in their provinces. Instead of using self-reported measure
19Available in WVS online portal, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp [Accessed January
7, 2016]
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of threat,20 I use the number of civilians killed in conflict in each province as a proxy
for the actual threat of violence for its residents. The data on civilian fatalities is
obtained from the Iraqi Body Count (IBC) website,21 which provides comprehen-
sive account on Iraqi civilians killed in the conflict since 2003. To account for the
temporal effect, I use the number of civilians killed in a province within the time
period of six months before the end of the survey. For the survey in 2004, I ag-
gregate civilian deaths in each of the 16 provinces from July to December 2004.
Similarly for the 2006 survey, I aggregate numbers of civilians killed in each of the
18 provinces from October 2005 to the end of March 2006.22 The panels in figure
2.4 show the level of violence in Iraqi provinces, measured by the number of people
killed in conflict six months before the survey.
A local dynamics that needs to be included in the Iraqi analysis is the three main
ethno-religious sects that are dominant in different regions. Kurds are majority in
the northern most provinces of Dihuk, Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya. Sunni major-
ity provinces include Tikrit, Al-Anbar, Mosul and Diyala. The rest are Shiite majority
provinces located mainly in the South. While approximately 65% of the population
are Shiites, the Sunni elites dominated the politics of the country during Saddam’s
rule prior to 2003. As a result, both Shiites and the Kurds struggled against the
repressive rule of Saddam Hussein (Thyne, 2009, p. 149-168). Therefore, I expect
that Sunnis are more likely to favor strong leadership of the previous regime, while
20The Iraqi survey wave does not include questionnaires on how much respondents worry about
war, civil war or terrorism, as in the sixth wave.
21Available: https://www.iraqbodycount.org/ [Accessed Februray 20, 2015].
22Assuming that memory of events that are closer temporally has greater effect compared to
events that happen long time ago, I create an index of decay function: d = (
∑n
i=1 vi(0.5)
i), where
i is the number of month before the survey month and vi is the aggregate level of killings due to
conflict in that month. d has higher weights for months immediately preceding the survey month
and decreasing weights for lagging months. Using this decay function has almost identical results
to that of six month aggregate violence. The result of the decay function is provided in the chapter
appendix.
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Figure 2.4: Level of violence in Iraq 2004, 2006
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Note: The figure above depicts levels of violence measured in the number of civilians killed due to
conflict in Iraq. The color scheme depicts the log of civilians killed between the month of July and
December in 2004, and between October 2005 and March 2006.
others are more likely to prefer democratic change. To account for these sectarian
preferences, binary variables are included in the model that measure whether or
not a respondent is Shiite or Sunni, using the WVS questionnaire that asks about
the religious denomination of the individuals.23 At provincial level, I include in the
model the population of each province obtained from the 1997 Iraqi census data.
At individual level, respondent’s age, education level and financial satisfaction
level are used as control variables, similar to the crossnational analysis earlier. I also
control for the individual’s level of religiousness, measured as self-reported scale
23The response choice does not include Kurds as a religious denomination. Kurds are Muslim but
the term Kurds is used to denote ethno-nationalist or territorial connotation rather than religious
(Stansfield and Anderson, 2009). Therefore, “Muslims” are the reference category. Out of the total
5026 respondents, 534 identify themselves as Sunni, 1351 as Shiite, 3086 as Muslim and 36 as
other religion like Orthodox and Catholic. I also control for regional dominance variable—whether
a province is Shiite, Sunni or Kurds dominant—and the results hold. The table that include the
regional dominance variable is provided in the chapter appendix.
37
from 1-10. Past studies on authoritarianism have established that highly religious
persons are more likely to uphold conservative values such as obedience or low
tolerance for sexual freedom. Since religion is more salient in Iraq, I control for
this variable rather than pre-disposed authoritarian as in the crossnational survey,
although controlling for the latter does not change the results.
Finally, I also control for the year of the two surveys. I use year dummy (variable
year 2006) as fixed effects, since I find variation in the level of violence not only
across provinces but also between the same province across different years. Fur-
thermore, unlike in 2004, the Iraqis in 2006 had experienced the first democratic
election after Saddam’s fall in 2005. As indicated by the literature on democratic
learning (Rohrschneider, 1999; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003), people should be
more supportive towards democracy in 2006. Yet, the changing nature of conflict
in 2006 should also influence their level of insecurities and the attitude towards
the support for strong leadership. These two competing expectations run in the
opposite direction, and using the fixed year effect should account for the change.
2.8 Results
Results of the Iraqi analyses are presented in table 2.2. There are two models in the
table and in both, I find positive and statistically significant relationship between
the number of civilians killed and the support for maintaining order and the need
for strong leadership. The explanatory variable in the models is in log transformed
scale since the data are highly skewed. Substantive results of the models are shown
in figure 2.5. According to left panel of the figure, which shows the marginal effect
from the first model in table 2.2, respondents in the most violent provinces are 15%
more likely to report the need for maintaining order as most important compared
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to those in the least violent provinces, on average and when controlling for other
variables.
Table 2.2: Provincial violence in Iraq and support for anti-
democratic orientations
Support for
Maintain Order Strong Leader
(1) (2)
Provincial level
Civilians killed (log) 0.08∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.09)
Sunni majority prov 0.30∗∗ 0.22
(0.12) (0.16)
Shiite majority prov −0.10 −0.27∗∗
(0.09) (0.13)
Year 2006 −0.23∗∗ −0.30
(0.11) (0.25)
Population −0.08 0.01
(0.20) (0.47)
Individual level
Age −0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Education −0.05 −0.20∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06)
Religious 0.13∗ −0.04
(0.07) (0.10)
Financial satisfaction −0.00 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
(Intercept) 468.02∗∗ 607.11
(215.13) (509.78)
Num. obs. 4603 4165
Num. groups: prov 34 34
Variance: prov.(Intercept) 0.33 1.95
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Note: Table above shows the effect of provincial violence level
in Iraq on anti-democratic orientation. The log of civilians
killed in a province is used as a proxy for the level of violence.
Baseline category for sectarian dominance is Kurds majority
provinces.
The right panel of the figure suggests that the effect of violence on the need for
a strong and undemocratic leader is large. Compared to provinces with lower level
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violence, respondents in more violent provinces are four times more likely to report
the need for strong leader. In summary, the contextual effect of violence shows that
threat from actual violence has a significant effect on individual’s anti-democratic
orientation. This result is similar to results from crossnational study above, where
the main explanatory variable was the self-reported “perceived” threat.
Figure 2.5: Effect of violence on democratic attitude
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Note: Above figures depict thesubstantial effect of violence intensity in Iraqi provinces on the anti-
democratic orientation among their residents, from model 2 and 3 in table 2. They show that when
violence intensity increases, as measured by number of civilians killed in x-axis, need for order and
strong leadership increases. The confidence interval level is at 95%.
I find that other variables in the model are also in the expected direction. On
average, respondents who identify themselves as Sunnis are more likely to report
that maintaining order is important, whereas Shiites have express that strong lead-
ership is not bad, suggesting their lower support levels for such strongman rule. As
discussed earlier, this result is in congruence with other studies (Nasr, 2007), that
Shiites are generally more opposed to rule under strong leadership because of their
past experience with Saddam’s regime. Moreover, they also are more likely to view
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electoral democracy as favorable because of their overwhelming majority status in
Iraq.
Among individual level variables, education level has negative coefficient in
both models, but is significant only in the second, suggesting that respondents with
higher education level are less likely to show support for strong leader. Finally,
year 2006 has negative coefficient but with statistical significance only for the first
model. This suggests that compared to respondents in 2004, Iraqis in 2006 were
less likely to report that maintaining order is the most important aspect for the
country. I also check for robustness by including the provincial mean of the indi-
vidual level variables to remove second level unobservable effects (Bell and Jones,
2015), and the main results hold.24 In sum, we find evidence, in both cross-national
analyses and a more focused Iraqi study, in support of the theory that threat from
violence increases an individual’s proclivity towards adopting an anti-democratic
attitude.
2.9 Conclusion
Democratic systems are considered ideal for peaceful management of social con-
flict and for building sustainable peace in post-conflict countries. Since conflicts
are costly for common citizens, it seems intuitive to think that voters fearing con-
flict and violence will endorse candidates or parties that are democratic, tolerant
and peaceful. However, quite the contrary, I argue in this study that when people
fear armed violence—perceived or real, they are less likely to adopt democratic
attitudes. I test this theory, first, by using crossnational survey data to examine
the influence of perceived fear of violence. I find that level of threat perception
24See table in chapter appendix.
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among citizens across nations has direct bearing on their undemocratic orienta-
tion. Second, I examine whether actual threat of violence has similar effect. Using
provincial level violence data from Iraq, I find that the number of people killed in
conflicts in each Iraqi province within six months prior to the 2004 and 2006 WVS
has direct effect on people’s support for democracy. In provinces with higher levels
of violence, individuals are more likely to prioritize the need for order and prefer
an undemocratic leader.
The findings in this study have important implication for post-conflict democra-
tizing countries, where fears of violence are common and national elections are pre-
scribed as the first important step towards the transition. The study questions the
popular trend of holding national level elections as panacea for challenges faced by
such countries. It indicates that national elections held without accounting for the
individual level insecurities can be counter-productive. During post-conflict tran-
sitional periods, policymakers and peacebuilders are often required to shift their
focus, in a short time period, from security to development, as conflicts in the coun-
try end. This creates policy volatility and leaves a gaping hole in terms of managing
insecurity at individual level. As result, individuals at such times tend to priori-
tize security over liberty and accountability, as indicated by this research. It also
compels us to think more on some of the measures that can enhance the quality
of democracy by building a sense of security among individuals—events like disar-
mament of ex-combatants, responsibility to protect the civilians, strengthening civil
society to exercise accountability, and deploying election monitors earlier rather
than waiting until the election day, which can raise cost for actors that seek to in-
timidate civilians. More important, an area that seems more promising to study
in future is conducting local level elections before the national level election in
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transitional periods, since these can better address the local concerns. Without first
addressing the micro-level insecurity among the voting mass, national elections can
only increase the risks of democratic failures.
43
Appendix for chapter 2
Figure 2.6: Random intercept for countries
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Note: Figures in panels above show the random intercepts of countries in models reported in table
1 in the main text.
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Table 2.3: Controlling for mean of individual variables
Order important Respect authority Strong leader
(Intercept) −2.34 4.78 −2.26
(1.40) (3.00) (2.69)
Individual level vars
Threat index 0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female −0.13∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.01 −0.01∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.03∗∗∗ −0.00 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Predisposed auth 0.06∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Country level vars
Polity −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP (log) −0.20∗ −0.18 −0.05
(0.10) (0.20) (0.18)
Mean of Individual level vars
Mean age 0.03 −0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Mean educaiton −0.03 −0.28 0.23
(0.07) (0.16) (0.14)
Mean income 0.29∗ −0.03 −0.07
(0.13) (0.28) (0.25)
Mean threat index 0.13∗∗ −0.11 0.15
(0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
AIC 77986.82 70163.02 72318.86
BIC 78113.21 70289.24 72444.69
Log Likelihood -38979.41 -35067.51 -36145.43
Num. obs. 61548 60817 59150
Num. groups: cname 53 53 53
Var: cname (Intercept) 0.18 0.82 0.66
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Figure 2.7: Random Intercept of Iraqi provinces
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Note: Figures in both panels above show the random intercepts of Iraqi provinces.
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Table 2.4: Iraq Case: Controlling for mean of individual level variables
Model 1 Model 2
Civilians killed (log) 0.09∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.06) (0.11)
Age −0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Education −0.05 −0.20∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06)
Religious 0.13∗ −0.04
(0.07) (0.10)
Financial Satisfaction −0.00 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Sunni 0.30∗∗ 0.20
(0.12) (0.16)
Shiite −0.11 −0.24∗
(0.09) (0.13)
Year −0.21∗∗ −0.24
(0.10) (0.20)
Population −0.01 −0.25
(0.22) (0.43)
Mean of Individual level vars
Province Mean Age 0.12 0.49∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.18)
Province Mean Education −0.98 −3.64∗
(1.13) (2.18)
Province Mean Religious 0.27 0.07
(1.00) (1.92)
Province Mean Finance satis 0.04 0.37
(0.28) (0.54)
Provincial dominance Kurds −0.08 0.74
(0.34) (0.64)
Provincial dominance Sunni 0.01 1.97∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.71)
(Intercept) 426.50∗∗ 473.23
(208.60) (401.19)
Log Likelihood -2930.51 -1665.10
Num. obs. 4603 4165
Num. groups: prov 34 34
Var: prov (Intercept) 0.29 1.08
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.5: Iraq Case: With Decay Effect of Violence
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Civilians killed (monthly decay) 0.07∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.03) (0.08)
Age −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
education −0.05 −0.05 −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Religious 0.13∗ 0.13∗ −0.04 −0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
Financial Satisfaction −0.00 −0.00 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Sunni 0.29∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.21 0.22
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16)
Shiite −0.10 −0.10 −0.27∗∗ −0.27∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
Year −0.20∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.21 −0.33
(0.11) (0.11) (0.28) (0.26)
Population 0.08 −0.08 0.53 0.07
(0.19) (0.20) (0.49) (0.48)
(Intercept) 403.74∗ 489.52∗∗ 411.87 647.56
(225.87) (215.19) (561.52) (520.52)
AIC 5888.48 5886.24 3375.63 3371.29
BIC 5952.82 5957.02 3438.98 3440.97
Log Likelihood -2934.24 -2932.12 -1677.82 -1674.65
Num. obs. 4603 4603 4165 4165
Num. groups: prov 34 34 34 34
Var: prov (Intercept) 0.38 0.33 2.47 2.01
LR test (Model Fit) 4.24∗∗ 6.33∗∗
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Note: Table above shows the effect of provincial violence level in Iraq on anti-democratic ori-
entation. Variable civilians killed in a province is the log of decay index, from the following
function: d = (
∑n
i=1 vi(0.5)
i), where i is the number of month before the survey month and vi
is the aggregate level of killings due to conflict in that month. d has higher weights for months
immediately preceding the survey month and decreasing weights for lagging months. Using this
decay function has almost identical results to that of six month aggregate effect.
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Chapter 3 Legacy of Violence and the Barriers to Democratization: Nepal’s
Post-conflict Election
Abstract
Recent studies indicate that holding elections in post-conflict countries
is risky, as they are likely to reignite violence. In this chapter, I examine
the voting patterns in such elections in order to understand why post-
conflict elections are unique and how fear of violence influences voting
outcomes. When a party perpetrates pre-election violence and intimi-
dation, I argue that fearful voters are likely to support the violent party,
mainly because of their past experiences and the anxiety that similar vi-
olence may recur in the future if the intimidating party lose the election.
I use Nepal’s post-conflict election in 2008 to test the argument. Using a
unique district level dataset, I find that higher levels of voter support for
a rebel-turn political party in areas where the party is reported to have
used higher levels of violence in the past and during the pre-election pe-
riod. The findings have direct implications for democratization in post-
civil war countries. By highlighting the perils of pre-election violence on
electoral outcomes, the results suggest that policymakers and election
monitors should pay more attention to pre-election periods rather than
just the election day.
3.1 Introduction
Post conflict elections (PCEs) at the end of violent intra-state conflict are some of the
many important events for building sustainable and democratic peace. A handful
of post-conflict case studies in countries like El Salvador in 1994, Liberia in 1997,
Cambodia 1993 and Angola 1992, surprisingly, indicate that voters often support
former belligerent groups or their affiliate parties (Allison, 2010; Lyons, 2004). In
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the Liberian PCE in 1997, for instance, citizens chose to elect Charles Taylor and his
violent party, the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPLF), against a close con-
tender, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her
non-violent struggle. Such electoral results—where voters elect violent groups—
present interesting puzzles for two reasons. First, for an average voter, violence
and conflicts are exceedingly costly; therefore, electing a violent group is seemingly
far more dangerous than electing a moderate party with peaceful agenda. Second,
almost all PCEs are secret ballot and are often accompanied by international elec-
tion monitors, as was the case of Liberia in 1997.1 For an individual voter, therefore,
casting a vote against violent parties should seem less risky, at least when consider-
ing the relatively high incentive of a peaceful party in power. Why then do citizens
in PCEs vote for violent parties given the clear benefits of electing a moderate party
and the relatively low risk of voting against violent parties in a secret ballot?2
One prominent challenge in such elections is voter intimidation, since former
belligerent parties are less likely to renounce the use of violence—the very resource
they have amassed over years of conflict. I argue that when exposed to pre-electoral
violence and intimidation, voters’ desire to maintain the peaceful status quo plays
an important role in their decisions. Due to their past experiences, voters who
fear recurring violence tend to support parties that they perceive are militarily
stronger and have the capability to resume violence if they lose the election. As
evidence, I present a within-case analysis of Nepal’s Constitutional Assembly (CA)
1This puzzle becomes more perplexing as election observers in PCEs often report no major vio-
lent incidents on election day. Liberia in 1997, Sierra Leone in 2002, Nepal in 2008 are few examples
where election observer reports do not indicate any major violent incidents on the election day.
2It should be noted that by “violent party”, the essay refers to a party that is affiliated with
belligerent group in the past conflict that has the potential to reignite violence. Another term used
in the chapter to indicate such violent party is “strong party” (that is, strong in terms of its violence
wielding capacity).
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election held in April 2008, eighteen months after the signing of Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended a decade long insurgency. This case provides a
rich explanation of the underlying patterns in voting behavior that are often masked
in cross-national studies. It also introduces a unique district-level dataset on Nepal
that includes district characteristics, including past violence levels and the CA re-
sults. The results show that a former rebel-turn-political party, the Communist Party
of Nepal (Maoists), were able to secure higher levels of voter support in districts
where they reportedly used higher levels of past and pre-election violence.
Understanding the influence of violence on voting behavior is crucial for the
post-conflict peace building literature. Recent works on PCE show that elections
in such contexts increase the risks of reigniting armed conflicts. They argue that
election timing is the key factor affecting the risk level, but do not systematically
examine the voting patterns or outcomes (Brancati and Snyder, 2013; Collier, Ho-
effler and Söderbom, 2008; Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). Others focusing on the
process of democratization find a pattern that election monitors often under re-
port pre-election violence due to what they refer to as “stability bias.” Election
observers, according to the authors, fear that reporting pre-election violence might
disrupt stability and, therefore, readily endorse elections in spite of the high levels
of pre-electoral violence (Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009; Kelley, 2012). This chapter
contributes to the discourse by further highlighting the perils of pre-election vio-
lence on the outcomes of elections in post-conflict countries.
More specifically, this chapter (1) sheds light on the deeper underlying mecha-
nisms that link violence with voting behavior, (2) illustrates the challenges that fear
of violence pose to post-conflict democratization process, and (3) indicates how ig-
noring these processes can lead to the institutionalization of violence later. A point
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of departure from the conventional wisdom is that violence in this chapter does
not necessarily refer to election day violence. Rather, the focus is on violence and
intimidation that occur prior to the main election day and how such activities may
influence electoral support in favor of the perpetrators. By exposing the mechanism
that systematically influences voters preferences, this research sheds light on how
policymakers can better deal with the challenges of building sustainable electoral
institutions in countries that have recently emerged from armed conflicts.
3.2 Voting Behavior in Fearful Contexts
Research on the impact of terrorist violence in democracies shows that contextual
factors shape individuals’ emotions and their electoral support for specific political
parties (Brader, 2005; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen, 2000). Merolla and Zech-
meister (2009a, p. 579), for instance, provide experimental evidence showing that
citizens tend to support conservative governments that prioritize national security
agendas in the context of high terrorist threats. The focus of these studies, how-
ever, is on political behavior in Western democracies. Our understanding of mass
voting behavior in the aftermath of long and uninterrupted violence like civil wars
is limited to few empirical studies. A recent article by Ishiyama (2014) argues that
a large and dominant party tends to emerge after post-civil war elections. The au-
thor finds that the bloodier the past war, the more likely it is for a dominant party
to get elected. Yet, the role of fear on electoral outcomes is not the main focus of
the paper and the mechanism of the voting behavior under the influence of fear
remains unclear.
Recent works also examine factors that increase the risk of conflict after PCEs
and point to two main reasons to explain conflict recurrence. First, they suggest
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that lack of institutions and unfair electoral practices cause the rise of violent par-
ties, and their electoral competition heightens the likelihood of conflict recurrence
(Paris, 2004; Reilly, 2003). According to Paris (2004:68) electoral competition
among former belligerents often turns into a“war by other means,”and in absence
of institutional capability to contain electoral malpractice, violence is often the re-
sult. This theory, however, looks primarily at the violent group actors and fails to
integrate the consequence of voting decisions of the mass and its effect on the ac-
tors. In many cases of PCE, election observers are often present and rather than
violence peaking on the election day, it is in the aftermath of election results that
armed conflicts begin. In the Angolan PCE in 1992, for instance, the leader of the
former rebel group, Jonas Savimbi, restarted the war after the election results de-
clared the incumbent party candidate, Edwardo dos Santos, the winner. Savimbi
claimed that his protests and complaints registered against electoral manipulation
by the incumbent party remained largely unheeded during the pre-election period
(Bayer, 1992, p. 16). The missing link in these discussions is the voting patterns of
the masses. While it is likely that political groups merely make allegations against
the opponents upon losing, it is unclear if Savimbi would have chosen to go to war
had there been fewer incidents of pre-electoral violence. The more important ques-
tion related to this chapter is whether or not the intimidation by the incumbent
party, MPLA’s blue uniformed police influenced the voters, as alleged by Savimbi’s
UNITA.
Second, others argue that people’s exposure to prolonged violence leads to a
violent culture (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2014) and, therefore, the support for violent
groups (Boyle, 2014;Steenkamp, 2009, p. 29-53). This argument assumes that
people in post-conflict societies are divided along the fault lines of conflict. While
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this may be true in certain types of ethnic conflicts, people in general have more
to lose from conflicts, especially when they are prolonged. Quite the opposite of
the cultural argument that hostilities and distrust increase after an armed conflict,
empirical works suggest that when exposed to costly wars, war-weariness sets in
among both fighting groups and the population. As a result, peace tends to last
longer if a country has sustained higher cost in terms of civil war duration or battle
deaths (David Mason et al., 2011, p. 185;Walter, 2004, p. 380). Instead of sup-
porting violence, the war-weariness hypothesis implies that voters should support
moderate parties in PCEs, rather than supporting violent groups.
Building on the past work, I present an argument on how fear explains voting
pattern in PCEs. I draw mainly from Lyons (2004), who argues that Liberians in
1997 voted for Charles Taylor’s violent group due to the fear that Taylor may spoil
the peace upon losing the election. Flores and Nooruddin (2012, p. 561) cite Lyons
and argue that, ironically, electing the violent party was one of the prime reasons
that led to the recurrence of violence in Liberia. Yet, while Lyons (1999) claim
is novel, the book offers several other possible explanations for Taylor’s electoral
success that make the above claims difficult to disentangle. Along with the fear
among voters, the author posits that other measures, such as financial and organi-
zational advantages, Taylor’s populist approach, and the perceived need for strong
leadership among voters, also contributed to Taylor’s victory (Lyons, 1999, p. 58-
60). Thus, the question of why fear of violence leads to an increase in support for
a violent party remains empirically unexplored. The following sections provide a
theoretical explanation on why this might be so, along with the analysis of Nepal’s
PCE as evidence to support the theory.
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3.3 Voter Behavior in the Aftermath of Armed Conflicts
Civilians bear heavy costs in internal armed conflicts. Eck and Hultman (2007)
show that as many as 572,767 civilians were killed in intra-state armed conflicts in
41 countries in the brief period since 1989. Civilians not only become the direct tar-
gets of the warring factions, but also suffer indirect costs like displacements, famine,
and disease. In short, the cost of conflict for an average voter is very high. Given
that citizens in post-conflict countries experience such high costs, a voter’s decision
to choose a party in a PCE is largely shaped by the fear of recurring violence and
the party’s potential to sustain the peace. From a rationalist standpoint, the median
voter takes this future cost into account and chooses a party that is strong in terms
of its violence-wielding capability since it can spoil the peace process upon losing
the election. This is the central assumption of Wantchekon’s (1999) game theoretic
model that analyzes the strategic behavior of political parties in PCEs. Based on
the assumption that fear influences voting behavior, the author argues that political
parties in PCEs have an incentive to threaten reneging on the peace agreement if
they lose. However, the authors rationalist assumption that voters will remain fix-
ated on the fear of conflict recurrence and not consider other positive policies of the
contending parties is somewhat simplified. Why do voters not focus on long-term
policies that address economic or developmental issues since former belligerents
are already committed to peace and have agreed to move forward peacefully? In
other words, why do such threats work in yielding support from the voters?
We can explain voters’ fixation on the fear of future violence and its effect
on their voting decisions through a psychological approach. As indicated by Lupia
and Menning (2007), psychological approaches of emotions often provide the right
frame to explain how rational actors assign payoffs when making decisions. In the
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following section, I use a psychological approach to theorize how a rational median
voter in PCEs decides to choose a violent group.
Studies show that people are more likely to make cognitively biased politi-
cal judgments in the context of anxiety (Arceneaux, 2012; Tversky, Kahneman and
Choice, 1981). Rather than making rational judgments based on long-term gains,
people in fear are loss aversive. Arceneaux (2012, p. 281) states, “Because humans
appear to have built-in preferences to avoid losses, arguments that claim to avert
losses have the potential to be more persuasive than those that claim to realize
gains.” Although not written precisely for post-conflict contexts, the author’s de-
scription of how anxiety impacts decision-making is directly applicable to the fear-
ful atmosphere prevalent in post-conflict societies. While voters living in peaceful
contexts might focus on factors like a candidate party’s long term policies, ideology,
interest, and campaign (Alvarez, 1997; Cheibub and Przeworski, 1999), those living
in societies that have undergone violent conflicts in the immediate past are likely
to remain fearful of its recurrence and value peace more. In game theoretic terms,
voters that fear conflict recurrence will assign higher payoffs for electing a party—
even if it is violent—if doing so sustains the peace. This psychological explanation,
therefore, helps to explain the rationalist assumption that voters decision-making
in PCE is overridden by fear of conflict recurrence in PCEs.
Theoretically, we can extrapolate two other possibilities from the discussion
above. Since voters’ senses of fear are influenced by their past experience, their
fears, on average, should vary with (1) the intensity of past violence and (2) the
time spent in peace. Holding time constant, I expect to find variation in voting
patterns across space as explained by the variation in past violence level. Voters in
districts with higher past violence should choose a militarily stronger party rather
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than a moderate party with peaceful policy position. This leads to the first hypoth-
esis:
Hypothesis 1: In post-conflict elections, the likelihood of voter support for a vi-
olent former belligerent party should be higher in districts that had greater scale of
violence in the past conflict.
In addition to high levels of past violence, the amount of time elapsed after
the end of armed violence should play a healing role. Psychologists have researched
the topic of human resiliency to cope with losses in the past (Bonanno, 2004). One
experimental study, coincidentally conducted in Nepal after the conflict, shows that
societies develop collective coping mechanism over the years spent in peace (Gilli-
gan, Pasquale and Samii, 2014). However, when the peaceful aftermath period is
interrupted with frequent violent events, people will continue to remain in fear.
Therefore, the presence of pre-election violence in first PCEs is likely to influence
electoral choices of the voters. All else being equal, people in districts that con-
tinue to experience pre-election violence will be more fearful of the cost of conflict
recurrence compared to those where there is no pre-election violence.
Past works, however, do not specify how pre-election violence may affect elec-
toral outcomes in PCEs. Wantchekon (1999), for instance, argues that political
parties in PCEs have an incentive to scare voters. The author argues that Taylor in
Liberia often scared voters by threatening to go back to war (1999, p. 253). How-
ever, the work does not explain why Taylor’s threats were credible. More important
events are the large scale physical intimidation carried out by his NPLF party, which
made his threats credible among the fearful voters. NPLF’s chilling campaign slogan
at the time was,“He killed my Ma, he killed my Pa, but I will vote for hi” (Outram,
1999).
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In sum, if people in post-war countries continue to experience some level of
intimidation and violence in their surroundings prior to the election, they should
be more loss averse than others who have experienced peace. As a result, voters in
regions that experience pre-election violence are likely to vote for a party in their
constituency that uses coercion and intimidation. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: In post-conflict elections, the likelihood of voter support for a vi-
olent former belligerent party should be higher in districts that had more incidents of
coercive pre-election violence.
While the above hypothesis establishes how mean levels of pre-election vio-
lence influence voting behavior in post-conflict elections, a more dynamic relation
between past violence and pre-election violence can be evaluated by simultaneously
considering time and violence. I further argue that fear is much higher when a re-
gion has both high past violence and pre-election violence. When a district has not
experienced high past violence, pre-election violence by a party may not to lead to
higher support for the party. It may even evoke anger from voters and backfire, thus
resulting in fewer votes for the violent party, as seen in the case of stable Western
countries where fear of violent groups lead voters to choose parties on the right
that have agendas to punish the perpetrators (Kibris, 2010; Merolla and Zechmeis-
ter, 2009a). But when the level of past violence and pre-election violence are both
high, there should be multiplicative effect of the two variables on the outcome of
support for the violent party. Statistically, this implies an interaction of the two
variables, past violence and pre-election violence, producing a positive coefficient
but with statistical significance only towards the side with higher values. We thus
expect to see much higher vote gain for the party in districts that have both high
level pre-election and past violence.
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Hypothesis 3: In post-conflict elections, when a party uses high levels of pre-
electoral violence, its likelihood of gaining voter support is higher in districts that have
experienced higher levels of violence in the past.
3.4 The First Post-Conflict Election in Nepal
To test the above expectations, I analyze Nepal’s 2008 Constitution Assembly (CA)
election. Focusing on a single case is often the best approach for exploratory stud-
ies as it provides the rich dynamics and depth necessary to better understand the
causality (Gerring, 2004) . Nepal’s case is recent and representative of most post-
conflict transitional countries. The CA election was held eighteen months after the
end of a decade-long insurgency that started in 1996 and claimed the lives of more
than 16000 people. Nepal’s CA election is an interesting case because, despite the
presence of moderate democratic parties and a brief history of electoral politics in
the past, people chose to elect the revolutionary Maoist party—the party that had
been engaging in the violent struggle against the government prior to the 2008
election. A comprehensive study on the origin of Maoist insurgency shows that the
movement started in the early 1990s from the heartland districts of western Nepal,
Rukum, Rolpa, Salyan and Jajarkot. Maoists in those districts first boycotted the
multiparty elections in 1994 and started to use violence against other local political
activists and police stations (Gersony, 2003, p. 39). A means of mobilization that
later became popular among the Maoists was mass abduction, either for ideolog-
ical indoctrination reasons or for using the abductees forcefully as manual labors
when attacking security force bases. For instance, in January 2005 alone, reports
suggested that Maoists had abducted 600 civilians from the Doti district in West-
ern Nepal, 177 students and 38 teachers from the Raamechap district, 500 youths
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in the Acham district, and 1100 students and teachers from the Sankhuwasabha
and Dhading districts.3 These forceful mass indoctrination campaigns towards the
end of insurgency signal the challenge that the movement was facing in mobilizing
the mass. In light of such a challenge, it is puzzling that the party got the highest
number of votes a few months later in the CA elections.
3.4.1 Why Focus on the Rebels?
Three key actors during Nepal’s conflict period were the monarchy, the Maoists, and
the democratic parties. Among the three, the two actors that used armed violence
were the state under the monarchy and the Maoists. However, after the end of con-
flict, the monarchy ceased to exist as an institution and the only actors competing
for power through elections were the Maoists and other democratic parties. During
the election in 2008, other political parties did not have the violent capacity like
the Maoists. In 2005, the constitutional monarch, who was the head of the armed
forces, had taken over political power from the democratic parties by launching a
coup with the help from army. As a result, all parties, including the Maoists, had
formed a united front against the king, who eventually gave in to the pressures of
the united front, thus leading to the monarchial defeat and signing of the peace
agreement (Phayal, 2011). Later, the new interim constitution declared Nepal a
republic and monarchial system came to an end.
During the CA elections, the only pro-monarchial party was Rastriya Prajan-
tatra Party (RPP), which had very few supporters to make any substantive differ-
ence in national politics. Among the democratic parties, Nepali Congress (NC) and
a democratic socialist party, United Marxist-Leninist (UML), were the two largest
3See news from archive on January 21, 22 and 28 of the national daily, The Kathmandu Post,
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/archive/ [Accessed: February 2013].
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parties against which the Maoists had to compete during the CA elections. The
military and armed police who were initially loyal to the king became indifferent
towards the two large democratic and non-violent parties during the transitional
period, since the latter had been protesting against absolute monarchial rule since
2005. The two big parties, therefore, were not backed by military capabilities like
the Maoists and were not in a position to credibly threaten violent conflict if they
lost the election. Only the Maoist party was militarily intact and could spoil the
peace if it lost the election.
A number of violent events in the country dropped significantly after the peace
agreement in 2006, but the Maoists continued using low scale violence after the
election date was declared. The violence level during the pre-election period was
far lower than the level seen during civil war days; nevertheless, it was much higher
than in normal pre-civil war days. Maoists formed an organization called the Young
Communist League (YCL) in the same month as the signing of the CPA in 2006.
Many YCL members had previously been a part of the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA), and they continued to dominate local politics by using force and coercion,
which they referred to as their “law enforcement” activities (UNOCHA, 2007). In-
ternational observers, such as the Carter Center and the International Crisis Group,
explicitly reported widespread concerns about the deliberate use of pre-electoral vi-
olence by the Maoists (Carter Center Report, 2008;ICG Report No.149, 2008, p.6).
These incidents indicate that Maoist violence prior to the election was neither spo-
radic nor isolated, but more deliberate and significant and that it was a significant
cause of concern for various actors. This trend of violent intimidation peaked as
election day approached, and diminished later after the Maoists won.4
4See South Asian Terrorist Portal website:
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/database/targetingpartyceasefire.htm
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3.5 The 2008 Constituent Assembly Election
Nepal’s CA election in 2008 was significantly different than regular parliamentary
elections of the past. To make it more inclusive and representative, a mixed-
electoral system was implemented and the total number of seats available was al-
most three times larger than that of past elections. Out of 601 seats, 240 seats were
allocated to winners of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) election from single member
constituencies spread across 75 districts. Of the remaining, 335 seats went to list
proportional representation (PR) system, and the final 26 seats were reserved for
minority candidates, nominated from the parties in proportion to their sizes. The
Maoists won both FPTP and PR as shown in the table below.
Table 3.1: Nepals Constituent Assembly Election results, April 2008
List PR seats
(335)
First Past the Post seats
(240) Total (575)
n % n % n %
CPN-Maoists 120 50 100 30 220 38
NC 37 15 73 22 110 19
CPN-UML 33 14 70 21 103 18
MPRF 30 12 22 7 52 9
TMLP 9 4 11 3 20 3
Others 11 5 59 18 70 3
Note: CPN-Maoists, Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist; NC, Nepali Congress; CPN-UML, Com-
munist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist; MPRF, Madhesi Peoples Rights Forum; TMLP,
Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party; Others, 20 parties and two independents. Source: Nepal Elec-
tion Commission, http://www.election.gov.np
This chapter will focus only on the FPTP results. In mixed electoral systems,
the PR system ensures the inclusion of smaller parties that have significant propor-
tion of supporters but very small chances of getting representation in an exclusively
FPTP system. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I use district-wide FPTP
results for two reasons. First, the number of votes gained by parties in district-wide
FPTP and PR results are correlated positively. Second, FPTP results should pro-
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vide a clearer and more accurate picture of the local dynamics, since voters were
voting for local party candidates in the FPTP ballot, but in the list-PR ballot, they
were voting for a party at national level. In the next section, I systematically an-
alyze whether or not fear and intimidation marginally increased Maoist votes as
predicted by the hypotheses.
3.6 Data and Model
The unit of analysis for this study is the district, and the hypotheses are tested using
district-level election data. I find district to be the most appropriate level of analysis
since it is the standard unit across various data sources. The dependent variable
is the Maoists vote share in the FPTP race, which is the sum of vote counts for
the Maoist party candidates in all electoral constituencies within a district divided
by the total number of valid casted votes in the district.5 Data for the Maoists
vote count comes from the official website of Nepal Election Commission, and it
varies substantially across all 75 districts.6 The following section provides a brief
description of the independent and control variables used, followed by a discussion
of the statistical method employed in this study.
3.6.1 Measuring Violence: the Main Explanatory Variables
The two main variables of interest are past violence and pre-election intimidation.
The variable past killings is the aggregate number of people killed in each district
from 2002 until the insurgency ended in 2006. The starting year is 2002 since the
level of violence escalated after the state of emergency was declared in November
5Depending on the size and population of a district, electoral constituencies for FPTP race range
from one to seven per district, and are all single member constituencies.
6http://www.election.gov.np/reports/CAResults [Accessed February 2013].
63
2001 and the country’s military mobilized for the first time to counter the insur-
gency. The variable pre-election violence is the count of violent incidents by the
Maoists aimed to intimidate civilians in each district after the declaration of the
election date and before the main election day. The variable is an index created by
aggregating the four different forms of violence perpetrated by the party cadres in
the pre-electoral period—threats, beatings, abductions, and killings.7 Data on all of
the above forms of violence comes from a human rights NGO, the Informal Sector
Service Center (INSEC), which has been operating in Nepal since 1988. The orga-
nization maintains a network of representatives in almost all districts even during
the civil war period, and has built the most comprehensive dataset on human rights
violations perpetrated by both state and non-state actors.8 The INSEC dataset is re-
ferred as a reliable source by more than one author (Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2009,
p. 391; Kalyvas, 2008), and has been used extensively in social science research
(e.g. Do and Iyer, 2010; Nepal, Bohara and Gawande, 2011). The incidents of pre-
election violence are coded as one-sided violence against civilians, making it a pure
indicator of the party’s attempt to impose control over population.9
3.6.2 Control Variables
It is important to first isolate people’s support for the Maoists out of fear by identi-
fying a potential confounding factor: people’s support due to congruence with the
7The factor loadings are quite high: abductions (0.79), threats (0.7), beatings (0.86) and killings
(0.22). Although the factor loading for killings is the weakest, the results do not change significantly
even when it is dropped. Factor loadings without killings are abductions (0.769), threat (0.752) and
beatings (0.857). The low factor loading for killings reflects the different dynamics in the Madhes
region that had more killings.
8See INSEC online information at http://www.insec.org.np.
9The data is not contaminated by violence data from military clashes and combatant deaths, as
the data before 2006 ceasefire tends to contain in similar previous works that use the INSEC data on
violence. This is the main reason for the high spikes in death tolls in areas that saw military clashes
during the insurgency period.
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party’s policy or ideology. Maoist policy can be best understood by looking at the
40-point demand list that they presented before the government prior to declar-
ing the Peoples War in 1996 (Hutt, 2004). The list emphasizes three main issues:
(1) call for nationalism against foreign intervention, (2) mobilization against eth-
nic and economic inequality, and (3) miscellaneous issues concerned with peoples
livelihood and economic poverty (Hutt, 2004). This demand list reflects the core
mobilizing narrative of the Maoists and their policy aims. The Maoist agenda during
the electoral period in 2008 was not markedly different from the past. Consider-
ing such policy orientations, I expect voters in districts with larger inequalities and
large poverty rates to show more support for the party. Economic inequality among
the voters is measured with data on a district-wide land holding GINI index. The
GINI index, along with human development index used in descriptive statistics,
comes from the United Nations Development Program document, the Nepal Hu-
man Development Report (2004). I also control for the horizontal inequality using
a variable identifying caste polarization in the main model, since Nepal is a country
with a caste-based system. Caste polarization is based on 2001 district-level census
data on population.10
After the CPA in 2006, a different set of political events were seen in the south-
ern plains of Nepal called the Madhes. Local ethnic Madhesi people had been polit-
ically marginalized by the non-Madhesi center for generations. The Madhesi move-
ment started with assertive demands for political inclusion (ICG Report No.136.,
2007) and was predominant in 14 of the 75 districts of southern Nepal under the
leadership of indigenous local leaders that had splintered from the Maoist party
10Polarization index=4Σψ2(1−ψ), where ψ is the proportion of caste i in the population (Duclos,
Esteban, & Ray, 2004). Similar to Do and Iyer (2010), castes that make up more than 1% of the
district population were retained, and castes that total less than 1% of the district population were
classified as “others.”
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(Miklian, 2009). After the first major general strike by the Madhesi groups in Jan-
uary 2007, more violent events followed (Hachhethu, 2007). Violence levels in 14
districts continued to escalate after Madhesi groups started to clash with cadres of
other non-Madhesis based parties, including the Maoists.11 Later, the Madhesi par-
ties won most of the electoral constituencies in these 14 districts. Since there was
a different dynamic ongoing in the 14 districts, these districts are controlled for by
using a binary variable called madhes in the models.
The next control variable, red districts, represents Maoist-dominated districts.
Gersony (2003) explains how the Maoist movement started from the two districts
in remote western Nepal: Rukum and Rolpa. By 2003, the number of districts
where the Maoists had established Jan Sarkar or the peoples government had ex-
panded to 25. These 25 core districts were declared as liberated, or the red districts
(Hachhethu, 2004). Although state forces sometimes conducted short military op-
erations in the hinterlands of these districts, Maoist militias dominated the areas
most of the time.12 Villagers paid revolutionary taxes to the Maoists and the lo-
cal militias kept a strict watch over peoples movement (Marks, 2007). Despite the
improved human rights situation after the CPA, challenging Maoists politically in
these red districts where YCL remained active was risky. The control variable red
districts is a binary variable coded as 1 for these 25 red districts and 0 otherwise.
Finally, I control for literacy and population in each district. Past research
shows a strong association between violence and education (Elbadawi and Samba-
nis, 2000; Thyne, 2006; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Specifically, literacy rates in
each district could influence people’s choices towards the Maoist party. The variable
11See IRIN News (2008) as some examples on Terai violence. Of the 109 armed groups and
outfits present in the country, as reported by the government in 2009, nearly 75 % concentrated in
Madhesi region (Manandhar, 2009)
12District headquarters usually had garrison military and police units
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log population is used for controlling population in each district. Data for both the
variables is obtained from the Nepal census data (2001).
Before exploring the regression analysis, I provide descriptive statistics and bi-
variate analyses to show how general ideological or policy reasons explain general
voting patterns. I then employ an ordinary least squares (OLS) model,13 since the
dependent variable is the Maoists district vote share on a continuous scale. Robust-
ness of the finding for the second hypothesis, pre-election violence, is examined
using coarsened exact matching (or CEM) before OLS. Pre-election violence acts as
a perfect treatment effect and CEM helps to determine its influence on the depen-
dent variable while avoiding model dependency (Iacus, King and Porro, 2011). The
75 districts are first matched on four aspects: income index, literacy percent, caste
polarization and total population, and then treated with the pre-election violence
index before testing the OLS model with the CEM weights.14 Finally, the third hy-
pothesis about interaction of the two independent variables is also tested using the
OLS model. In the next section, I first analyze people’s support for the party using
descriptive statistics, and then discuss the results of the full model.
3.6.3 Explaining Support for the Maoists
A number of scholars indicate that poverty and inequality are the main cause be-
hind the rise of the violent Maoist revolution in Nepal (Acharya, 2010; Do and Iyer,
13I cross checked by using truncated regression, as the dependent variable Maoist vote share is in
percent form, and also with a negative binomial model, using Maoist vote count in each district as
the dependent variable and controlling for district population (among other variables). The results
from these models that show the effects of main independent variables do not differ from the main
model.
14CEM reduces observations from 75 to 41 observations, but the imbalance factor in the model
decreases from 0.875 to 0.5 after coarsening. The combination of bins to reduce imbalance is found
to be optimum, since reducing imbalance further results in losing observations. The cut point for
violence treatment is taken as the 25th percentile of the violence level—that is violence index of 13.
In other words, violence level more than this indicates the presence of violence.
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2010; Nepal, Bohara and Gawande, 2011; Murshed and Gates, 2005; Thapa and
Sijapati, 2004). In order to test whether these factors were responsible for Maoist
voteshare in the elections later, I conduct bivariate analysis of the election outcome
and two measures of poverty and inequality: income index and human develop-
ment index (HDI) in table 3.2. The first column of the table presents the economic
situation in Maoist dominated red districts. Comparing the first two columns, I find
that the mean of all red districts have a lower HDI and a higher poverty rate than
in non-red districts, indicating that Maoist stronghold area during the conflict years
were indeed those that were lagging behind economically. However, the third col-
umn shows that the districts where the Maoists won the elections are not as poor
and that they have higher levels of HDI. In other words, there is a weak correlation
between the Maoist grievance-based narrative and their level of support in poorer
districts during the CA election. This is not to say that economic grievance played
no role, but from the bivariate result in table 3.2, it is difficult to credit Maoists
economic policy as the basis of their electoral success. A counter argument could
perhaps be that the overall low poverty rate of the country and the poor perfor-
mance of the incumbent parties to control instability may have led the people to
support the former rebels. This counter argument, however, does not explain the
within-country variation seen in the electoral results.
Perhaps the Maoist electoral victory is merely a reflection of unwavering pop-
ular support since the beginning of democratic change in the 1990s. Nepal, Bohara
and Gawande (2011, p. 887) imply widespread popularity of the Maoists, as the
paper states that the United Peoples Front (UPF), the mother party of present day
Maoists, in 1991 was the third largest political party in the lower house parliament.
However, this is questionable due to the fact that they won only 9 out of 205 seats
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Table 3.2: Comparing the grievance factor
Red districts Mean
(n=25)
Average in non-red
districts (n=50)
Districts where Maoists
won 3 or more
Constituencies*
(n=15)
Human Dev Index
(HDI)
.311 .324 .337
Income Index .459 .394 .356
Note: The above table shows human development index (HDI) and poverty rate in Maoist domi-
nated red districts, in districts where the Maoists won in 2008 elections, and, finally, in districts that
were non-red. It shows the contrast that the Maoists mobilized red districts were poorer and less
developed in HDI terms, but where they won elections are richer and relatively more developed.
Source: UNDP 2001
(4.8%) in the 1991 elections, while the other two major parties, UML and NC, won
69 (28%) and 110 (38%) seats, respectively (Gaige and Scholz, 1991). This sug-
gests that the Maoists were a distant third in terms of their popularity at the time.
In the 1994 elections, the Maoists did even worse. A faction of UPF boycotted the
elections and two years later declared the peoples war against the state. Therefore,
we cannot be confident that the party enjoyed popular support since the pre-war
days. Another possibility is that a large number of people may have shifted their
ideological positions after the Maoist movement that started to peak since mid-
1990s. However, if this was the case in the 2008 elections, then we should have
seen this shift from the people that are on the ideological left rather than the ones
on the right. Quite the contrary, we find that the Maoists in 2008 seem to have
pulled majority of the NC votes from the right and not the leftist UML votes (see
figure 3.1).15 Therefore, the logic of mass ideological shift in 2008 election does
not match well with the evidence.
15As mentioned earlier, the two other dominant parties in the Nepalese politics have been the
NC and the UML, which are on the right and left from the political spectrum, respectively. In 2008,
compared to 1999 midterm elections, UML lost total 300,000 votes approximately, while NC lost 1
million votes.
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Figure 3.1: Vote share comparison of the two major parties for the year 1999 and
2008
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Note: The figure above depicts the voteshare of the two major parties, Nepali Congress and
United Marxist Leninist (UML), in 1999 and 2008 elections. Compared to 1999 when the
Maoist party was not contending, NC in 2008 suffered much loss. This comes as a surprise
since NC supporters are more on the right of the political spectrum compared to the UML.
Comparing with earlier elections further, I find similarity between 2008 elec-
tion and the one held in 1991 with respect to two key aspects: both were held after
a major change in the political context,16 and in both, the Maoist party was a com-
petitor. The differences, however, are the absence of widespread violence before
the 1991 elections and the weak support for the Maoists at the time. There were
only a few sporadic incidents of intimidation and violence then, which the local
police were able to contain at the district level (Gaige and Scholz, 1991). In con-
trast, the 2008 elections followed a decade-long civil war and reports of substantial
pre-election violence by the same party. Although the international election mon-
itors declared the election fair, their report cites the pre-election period as marred
by insecurity and violence, undermining the freedom of movement (Carter Center
Report, 2008, p. 27). Do we find the level of violence, both during civil war period
161990 saw the end of one party monarchy and the rise of constitutional monarchy; 2006 marked
the beginning of end of monarchy, and the monarchy was formally abolished in 2008.
70
and pre-election phase, partly explaining the voteshare for Maoists? Following sec-
tion analyzes this effect of violence more systematically and tests the hypotheses.
3.7 Fear of violence and Election Results
Table 3.3 presents results of regression models on the effect of violence on election
outcome. The first three columns in the table are coefficients from the OLS regres-
sion, and the rightmost column is the result from an OLS estimate after coarsened
exact matching (CEM). Model 3 is the main model. To restate, the two main vari-
ables of interest in the models are: (1) district-wise past killings measured as the
number of people killed during the last four years of conflict, and (2) pre-election
violence by the Maoist cadres to intimidate voters, an index created from different
forms of violent activities reported in each district. Since both past killings and
pre-election violence are correlated, the results are presented separately in the first
two models and then combined in Model 3.17
First, model 3 shows that past violence is positive and statistically significant
at p<0.05. The coefficient for the variable is 0.032. This tells us that, on average
and holding all other variables constant, if a district experiences 100 more deaths in
the past, then the voteshare of the Maoist party is likely to increase by 3.2 percent.
This is significant since number of deaths in the last four years of the past conflict
ranged from 1 to 639 per district. 55 districts out of the total 75 suffered more than
100 deaths in the past and 29 districts had more than 200 deaths. This increase
of 3.2 voteshare is important since the mean margin of victory across districts—
that is, the mean difference of vote counts between the winner and the second
big party—is 34,782, which is 3.35 percent of Maoist voteshare. In summary, an
17Despite the correlation, placing both variables in the same model as in model (3) or (4) is not
problematic since the variance inflation factor (VIF) is 6 (Greene, 2011, p. 90).
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Table 3: Effect of violence on vote share in Nepal’s 2008 elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS after 
CEM 
     
Past killings  0.041*** 0.032** 0.036** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) 
Pre-election violence 0.123***  0.087** 0.080** 
 (0.040)  (0.041) (0.039) 
Literacy percent -0.135 -0.097 -0.090 -0.093 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.111) (0.176) 
Caste polarization 29.145* 10.440 17.411 30.700* 
 (15.618) (15.688) (15.616) (18.112) 
Gini 20.692 0.814 14.911 12.342 
 (27.909) (26.726) (26.837) (41.480) 
Red districts 6.845** 5.851* 5.972** 8.449** 
 (2.991) (2.963) (2.886) (3.827) 
Madhes -12.219** -14.990** -13.957** -7.915 
 (5.885) (5.810) (5.678) (7.446) 
Population (log) -2.847 -4.499** -5.159** -8.269** 
 (2.035) (2.174) (2.139) (3.828) 
Constant 47.148* 83.177*** 78.555*** 108.928** 
 (26.375) (28.612) (27.946) (44.822) 
     
Observations 75 75 75 41 
R-squared 0.548 0.562 0.591 0.828 
Adjusted R-squared 0.501 0.517 0.542 0.785 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (one tailed). 
Note: Dependent variable above is the Maoist vote-share per district. Models (1), (3) and (4) 
show the positive association of Maoist pre-election violence on their vote gain, controlling 
for other variables. Models (2), (3) and (4) also show the positive effect of past violence in 
each district for Maoist vote gains. People in districts that suffered higher cost in the past 
conflict have voted more for the Maoist party. The main model is model (3). Model (4) is 
result after matching district characteristics in four measures: literacy, income index, caste 
polarization and population, and treating with pre-election violence at 25th percentile.  
 
 
increase in the level of past killings is found to strongly increase the vote share for
the Maoist party. This finding provides support for the hypothesis that that peoples
violent experience in the past is related to their voting behavior (H1). All else equal,
people in districts where levels of past violence was high were more likely to vote
for the Maoists.
Next, we turn to the effect of intimidation on voting behavior of people in
PCEs. Model 3 in table 3.3 shows that the coefficient for variable pre-election vi-
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olence is 0.087 and statistically significant at p<0.05. Interpreting this result, an
increase of pre-election violence level by 30 units increases the Maoist vote share by
2.61 percent. In substantive terms, with 10 incidents each of abduction, threat and
beating by the Maoists, their vote share increases by 2.61 percent on average. This
is meaningful and the increase in vote share substantively since the mean number
of abductions, threats and beatings by the Maoists is 6.56, 8.5 and 12.7 respec-
tively. In other words, pre-election violence has a very strong effect on their victory.
Analyses to examine the treatment of pre-election violence can be best observed
using matching, where other characteristics of the districts are matched and the
effect of treatment of pre-election violence observed. The result in the matching or
CEM model is robust even when reducing the pre-election violence level cut point
to as low as 10th percentile.18 This shows that post-conflict society in Nepal was
sensitive to even a small increase in pre-election violence (H2).
In addition to the violence, control variables red districts and Madhes produce
interesting results. The variable red districts has positive coefficient that is statis-
tically significant at p<0.05. As mentioned earlier, this variable indicates that the
25 districts that were declared as liberated districts by the Maoists party during the
conflict had higher levels of support. As expected, the positive coefficient indicates
that Maoist party received larger vote share from these districts compared to oth-
ers. Finally, the variable Madhes is negative and statistically significant at p<0.05,
indicating lower levels of support for the Maoists in Madhesi districts. This result
accurately portrays the violent conflicts in the 14 Madhesi districts that were ongo-
ing between the local indigenous groups and the Maoists. As explained above, the
18As mentioned earlier, the cut point for violence for matching is 25th percentile, which is the
violence of 13 units. 10th percentile reduces the violence to 9 units. In other words, even when
the aggregate violence index is 9, the effect of violence is significant in increasing the vote count.
However, reducing it to the 10th percentile shrinks the observation to 30 with significance at p<0.1.
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rift between the two started earlier and culminated to the highest level just a few
months prior to the elections.
3.7.1 The Interaction Effect
The third hypothesis indicates that levels of past violence interacts with pre-electoral
violence by the Maoists, and thus affect their vote share. According to the hypoth-
esis, I expect the marginal effect of high level pre-election and past violence on
Maoist vote share to be positive and statistically significant. In other words, we
should observe higher level of voter support for the party in those districts where
both past violence level and pre-election violence by the party is high. While this
suggests an interaction term of the two variables, the theoretical expectation is
that the combined effect of the two variables should be significant only when both
variables are high, but not when both are low.
I first convert the two variables (past killings and pre-election violence) to
logarithmic scale since the conversion of these non-linearly distributed variables
makes their interaction effect easier to trace in the OLS model. The result of the in-
teraction is presented in figure 3.2(c), (d) and figure 3.3.19 The interaction term in
the model is not statistically significant, but following (Brambor, Clark and Golder,
2006, p. 74), it is important to examine the details of the interaction effect in order
to interpret it correctly. The two lower panels in figure 3.2 show the effect of the in-
teraction for each of the two variables, pre-election violence and past-violence. The
top two panels help to interpret the logged variables and show the threshold points
after which they become significant. They show that the interaction of the two vari-
ables become significant when a district in the past has experienced more than 152
19In the interaction model (presented in chapter appendix), all other variables except the inter-
action term are substantively identical to those in model 3.
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Figure 3.2: Log transformation and interaction of past killings and pre-election
violence
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(a) Log of total past killings
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(b) Log of pre-election violence events
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(c) Log of total past killings
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
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(d) Log of pre-election violence events
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Note: The top two figures above depict the logarithmic transformation of (a) total people
killed during the last four years of conflict (2002-2006) and (b) the number of pre-election
violent events, per district. The bottom two figures are the marginal effects of (c)
pre-election violence (logged) and past violence (logged), and; (d) past violence (logged)
and pre-election violence (logged), on the Maoist vote share. The bottom two provide the
threshold of the two interaction variables. In the last four years of conflict, when a district
suffered around 152 deaths (mean in the 75 districts) or more, pre-election violent events
by the Maoists that were a little above mean level yielded a positive vote gain for the
Maoist party, significant at p¡0.05.
killings in the period of 2002 and 2006, and when numbers of pre-election violent
events were higher than 40. Figures 3.3 shows the substantive effect of pre-election
violence at varying level of past violence. As expected, only higher levels of past
killings show the conditioning effect (lower two panels of figure 3.3). When the log
of past violence is at a low value of 1 (substantively when only 3 people killed in
a district, as in the top left panel of figure 3.3), the effect of pre-election violence
75
Figure 3.3: Marginal effects of pre-election violence and past killings on Maoist
vote share
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Note: Above figures depict the result of interaction term past killings and pre-election
violence on vote gain for the Maoists in Nepals 2008 election, controlling for all other
variables in model 3 of table 3.3. The 4 panels show the conditional of higher level of
pre-election violence on Maoist vote share, when past killings are kept constant at various
levels.
has a negative, though not statistically significant, effect. Although not statistically
significant, this negative reaction against perpetrators of pre-election violence in
areas with less past violence seems to align somewhat with the past studies on
the effect of terrorist threats in Western democracies, where voters are found to
support conservative parties, viewed as more aggressive in seeking to punish per-
petrators. Similarly, when the log of past violence level increases only slightly to 2
(representing 7 people killed in the past, as shown by the top right panel of figure
3.3), pre-election violence does not produce much change in the Maoist vote share.
However, when the log of past violence is 5 (the number of people killed in the
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past is 148, bottom left panel in figure 3.3), then an increase in log of pre-election
violence from 3 to 6 (increase in the number of actual events from 20 to 403) in-
creases the Maoist vote share from 34% to 46%. When the log of past violence is 6
(the number of people killed in the past is 403, bottom right panel in figure 3.3),
then an increase in the log of pre-election violence from 3 to 6 increases the Maoist
vote share from 38% to 54%. In short, higher intimidation levels in a district due to
higher levels of pre-election violence by the party would result in a very large party
vote share (more than 10%), but only when the district has a history of high past
violence.
In summary, results show that among many factors, levels of past violence
and the levels of pre-election violence by the Maoists during Nepal’s post conflict
election in 2008 had a significant effect on people’s voting behaviors. In other
words, voters in PCEs tend to make their voting decisions based predominantly on
fear and not on the evaluation of other policy agendas of contending parties. This
may be the primary reason as to why violent parties emerge after PCEs, ultimately
increasing the risk of conflict recurrence.
3.8 Conclusion
The aim of this article is to uncover the effect of violence on voting patterns. It
presents a theoretical account of how violent experiences of the past and pre-
election period cause voters to choose a party affiliated with violence. The theory
sheds light on the understanding of electoral mobilization in post-conflict scenarios
and on the micro-level study of violence. Evidence presented in the study shows
that the level of past violence and the fear it generates among people can result
more in support for a violent party in a post-conflict country. One limitation of
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the study is that the individual level of fear and the desire for peace is measured
indirectly using the level of violence in the district. A survey study conducted in
Nepal during the pre-election period shows that the majority of population asso-
ciated the CA election with peace, security and stability (Hachhethu, Kumar and
Subedi, 2008). However, the survey lacks questionnaires that are more relevant or
specific to the research question of this study and provides only summary statistics.
A future survey or field experiment at a cross-national level would be helpful in
capturing such individual level dynamics.
Theory and evidence presented here opens avenues for further research to
understand how the fear of violence and election timing may be associated. While
timing in this study is constant, it suggests that when other factors are constant,
holding PCEs early leads voters that have fresh memories of past conflict to choose
violent groups because of the fear that doing otherwise may result in armed conflict
recurrence. This is in agreement with Flores and Nooruddin (2012), that electing
violent groups leads to institutionalization of violence and increases the risk of
conflict recurrence. However, findings here indicate that even when a country holds
PCE at a later date, its risk of armed conflict will be high when there is pre-election
violence. Future research at a cross-national level could identify the interaction of
timing and pre-election violence. Finally, the results inform policymakers of the
need to evaluate the pre-election period more seriously as it has substantial impact
on the results later. Complementing Kelley (2012), the results here show the need
for election monitors to check not just the election-day violence, but also to focus
on building mechanisms that deter violence and intimidation much earlier. Future
inquiry should also be made on the longer term effects of the outcomes whereby
violent parties rise through the use of pre-election violence and intimidation.
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Appendix for chapter 3
Figure 3.4: Violence data
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Figure 3.5: Red districts and Maoist Voteshare
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Table 1B: Vote-share and Maoist Violence before 2008 elections (OLS Regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
Violence 4.119**     
 (1.053)     
Abductions  0.430**    
  (0.136)    
Threats   0.162*   
   (0.074)   
Beatings    0.259**  
    (0.070)  
Killings     -0.125 
     (0.161) 
Literacy percent -0.210 -0.261 -0.187 -0.190 -0.211 
 (0.123) (0.131) (0.129) (0.124) (0.134) 
Caste polarization 30.229 20.223 30.954 33.814 25.568 
 (18.332) (17.874) (19.474) (18.980) (19.263) 
Gini 10.983 -4.745 6.491 8.385 -10.752 
 (16.846) (15.340) (17.541) (17.560) (18.343) 
Red districts 5.580 5.384 7.229* 5.113 6.855* 
 (3.208) (3.291) (3.280) (3.233) (3.388) 
Madhes -13.934* -17.536** -12.707 -12.234 -13.888* 
 (6.071) (6.024) (6.528) (6.443) (6.295) 
Past violence -1.226 -0.967 -0.473 -1.062 -0.018 
 (1.902) (1.996) (1.956) (1.662) (1.843) 
Total valid votes -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 25.585 37.884* 22.255 20.336 35.836 
 (18.262) (17.354) (20.003) (19.185) (18.607) 
Observations 75 75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.551 0.536 0.510 0.544 0.489 
Adjusted R2 0.496 0.480 0.451 0.488 0.427 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
DV: Maoist vote-share per district 
(Note: The OLS regression above is for unmatched data. Since DV Maoist voteshare 
lies between 1-100, truncated regression was also used. The result is not different from 
the above OLS regression. These results do not differ significantly from the main 
result in table 1)  
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Chapter 4 Risk of Conflict Recurrence After Post-Conflict Elections
Abstract
National elections held after armed conflicts are crucial parts of a transi-
tional phase. Quite the contrary to our expectations, however, research
suggests that post-conflict elections increase the risk of conflict recur-
rence, and that the risk is higher when they are held early. This chapter
seeks to build on the past work and examine causal factors that exac-
erbate this risk. I use event history analysis to examine cross-national
cases from 1950-2010 and find initially that incidents of pre-election
violence are generally much lower in post-conflict countries, since con-
tending parties in such countries are fearful of costly conflict escala-
tions. However, the result shows that when present, even a low scale
pre-election violence can become a significant predictor of recurrence
of violence later. The study suggests that rather than focusing on just
election day irregularities, policymakers seeking to sustain peace after
such post-conflict elections should pay more attention to the incidents of
electoral violence and intimidation around six months ahead. Overall,
this chapter analyzes the role and relevancy of elections in keeping the
peace after an armed conflict.
4.1 Introduction
The first election held after the end of intrastate wars are important transitional
events in achieving peace and stability. Because of their symbolic value, hold-
ing such elections is often a high priority among peacebuilders and other stake
holders. Some scholars recommend to policymakers capitalize on the consensus
reached among the key players by holding elections and starting the process of
democratic institutionalization. Analyzing seven1 post-conflict election (PCE) cases,
1El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Tajikistan and Angola
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Lyons (2004, p. 57), for instance, emphasizes on setting up electoral administra-
tion sooner rather than delaying to hold an election that meet certain conditions.
Setting up for elections early, according to the author, helps to start the process of
political norm-building.2 However, more recent work on armed conflicts and civil
wars suggest that elections increase the risk of conflict recurrence (Collier, Hoeffler
and Söderbom, 2008), especially when they are held early (Brancati and Snyder,
2013; Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). This chapter seeks to go beyond the issues
of timing and investigate other election related factors that make post-conflict elec-
tions (PCEs) risky events. In particular, it seeks to answer, does pre-election violence
along with electoral fraud increase the risk of conflict recurrence for countries that
hold elections for the first time after the end of a war?
Upon a cursory look at a few countries with first PCEs, I find that the level
of pre-election violence is one of the key difference between those where violence
recurred and others where peace sustained. In Sierra Leone’s PCE in 2002, for in-
stance, the violent events in the election year dropped by more than 50 percent
compared to the year before. This tapering of violence during the pre-electoral pe-
riod has been followed by stability and growth. From 2002 to 2012, the average
GDP growth rate of the country has been 8.66 percent (World Bank, 2012). In
contrast, the case of Mali, since the PCE in the early 1990s has been an example of
recurring conflict. In 1992, the government held peace talks with the Tuareg rebels
and made constitutional changes to accommodate rebel demands, followed by a
2Lyons (2004:43) argues that Institutional change is an incremental process in which opportu-
nities seized in the short run accumulate to create long run outcomes that may be unanticipated and
that Precedents, expectations and fledgling institutions created during the interim period will form
context for post conflict elections and will shape the path of transition. One example the author pro-
vides is the post-conflict elections in Tajikistan in 2000 that was regarded as flawed by the election
observers. Yet, the author points to the United Nations observer mission in the country that ended
in the same year, suggesting that despite the election irregularity, peace prevailed.
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PCE at the national level. Within one year of the election, however, conflict broke
out again. The next peace settlement in 19963 was followed by subsequent elec-
tions in April 1997 (Humphreys and Mohamed, 2005; Wallensteen, 2011, p. 212).
The second PCE also resulted in an armed conflict ten years later. Scrutinizing
the pre-electoral periods of both Malian PCEs in the UCDP georeferenced events
dataset (Sundberg, Lindgren and Padskocimaite, 2010), we find that the number
of violent incidents during the year preceding the election day is quite high. In the
1992 election, the violence level in the election year rose by more than three times
compared to the year before, followed by an outbreak of civil war two years later.
During the second PCE in 1997, the number of violent events in the election year
was 50 percent more compared to that of the previous year. Isolated examples like
these beg for a more systematic analysis of the effects of pre-electoral violence on
conflict recurrence.
In this chapter, I argue that an election loses its credibility as a conflict man-
agement tool if it is rigged, thus increasing the risk of conflict recurrence. In par-
ticular, I focus on two events that are expected to lower credibility and legitimacy
of elections, incidents of election fraud and pre-electoral violence. By identifying
these causal factors, this study illustrates the role and relevancy of elections in
keeping the peace after intra-state conflicts. Theoretically, it highlights the mech-
anism of conflict recurrence after the first PCE and helps us understand how elec-
tions can serve as a tool in managing internal conflicts. At the policy level, the
implications are relevant in at least two areas: democratization efforts and peace-
building. Not only do the findings help enhance our understanding of the dynamics
of peacebuilding, they also highlight the areas that election monitors need to ex-
3Peace settlement known as the Flamme de la Paix (Flames of Peace), symbolized by a ceremony
of big fire, burning the weapons handed by the fighters.
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amine more closely in order for peace to be sustained after a PCE. For instance,
Kelley (2012) shows that international election monitors tend to underreport pre-
election violence to prevent their negative assessment from fueling further violence
in country—what she calls the stability bias.4 This study complements prior re-
search by clearly demonstrating how such biases can actually undermine demo-
cratic stability in a country. In summary, the findings in this chapter can help
enhance our understanding of the transitional process of post-civil war countries
towards building a sustainable peace.
Rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. I first discuss the past literature and
highlight the lack of clarity on how conflicts recur after the first PCE. I then discuss
different conditions, built on the past works that best predict a peaceful or violent
politics after holding a PCE. The empirical section begins with the introduction of
data and proposed methodology, followed by the analysis aimed at testing hypothe-
ses. I conclude by summarizing the main findings of this study along with important
implications for policy-making and future research.
4.2 PCE through two lenses: Democratization and conflict studies
The study of PCEs straddles the two main sub-fields in political science—conflict
and peace studies in international relations and the democratization studies within
comparative politics. The comparative literature views transitional elections as an
important event for building stable democracies, in part because repeated elections
help strengthen the role of political parties and smoothen democratic transitions
(Howard and Roessler, 2006; Manning, 2002; Schedler, 2002b). Some further ar-
4Kelley (2012, p. 72) argues that election monitors consider how their assessment may affect
the stability of the country. By stability bias, she refers to the worry among the monitors that their
negative assessment may fuel violence in the country.
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gue that repeated elections not only consolidate democracies but also resolve dis-
pute peacefully since habituation of democratic process helps channel grievance
among the people politically without having to resort to violent means (Reilly,
2003; Rustow, 1970).
Prior studies on democratization point that holding a number of fair elections
over time positively influences the process of democratic consolidation. Examin-
ing a universe of 232 African elections, for example, Lindberg (2006) argues that
violence-free repetitive elections contribute to the consolidation of democracy in
the long run. The author uses the presence of electoral violence as one of the key
indicators to gauge electoral legitimacy. Similar to Lindberg, more recent works on
election monitoring highlight the perils of electoral irregularities on consolidation
of democracies and how the presence of election monitors help democratic transi-
tion by minimizing such irregularities (Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009; Hyde, 2011; Kel-
ley, 2012). Hyde (2011) argues that autocratic incumbents adopt more appeasing
policies and choose moderate positions, especially in presence of election monitors.
According to Beaulieu and Hyde (2009), oppositions also bargain for more political
space through non-violent means of electoral boycotts, when election monitors are
present. Others argue that international observers help diffuse democratic norms
and deter electoral misconducts by local actors, thus enhancing the quality of polit-
ical participation (Kelley, 2012, p. 166). However, while the focus of these studies
is on democratic consolidation through elections, they do not specifically focus on
the universe of post-conflict cases necessary to examine the research question of
this chapter.
Very few studies that intersect the areas of democratization and conflict ex-
amine the role of actors in sustaining the peace as they transform from violent
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organizations to functioning political parties (Manning, 2002, 2008; Söderberg Ko-
vacs, 2007). While Söderberg Kovacs (2007) argues that group cohesion, popular
support and international legitimacy are the main determinants of such transfor-
mations, Manning (2008) emphasizes the role of repeated elections that help build
the peaceful norm. Both studies present a detailed comparative analyses of a few
interesting cases over a longer period of time and remain optimistic about the role
of elections on democratic transition, much in line with other comparative studies
mentioned above. But other research focusing particularly on the instrumental use
of violence by actors is more cautious, suggesting that electoral competition often
increases the risk of large scale violence even in mature democracies (Wilkinson,
2004; Sives, 2010), or, during regime transitions, when violence is often the key
tool for manipulating outcomes (Schedler, 2002a).
The conflict literature, that focus on why countries fall into the armed conflict
trap, finds that post-conflict elections are significant factors in increasing the risk
of conflict recurrence. Conflict studies often focus on group level actors and their
decisions, rather than macro level factors like economy that democratization stud-
ies emphasize(Collier, 2003; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Paris, 2004; Snyder, 2000)5.
In his detailed analysis of the post-conflict transitional period, Collier (2009, p.39)
states that PCEs increase the risk of violence because of the high stakes that the
contending parties have in the event. The author provides a summary of causal
process:“the winner gleefully anticipates untrammeled power: no checks and bal-
ances here. The loser anticipates its fate under the thumb of its opponents and
knows there is but one recourse: back to violence” Collier (2009, p.82).
Yet, the seemingly simple definition of how the insider parties—those con-
5Often referred to as spoilers of peace (Stedman, 1997)
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tending the election—can choose to start violence, is complex when scrutinizing
at the process. Spoilers of post conflict peace may not always be insiders, but also
groups that are not part of the peace process (Nilsson, 2008; Stedman, 1997). Even
when we consider the insider spoilers as suggested by Collier (2009), it is somewhat
counter-intuitive that the insider parties agree to contend the elections in order to
avoid the cost of war, and not anticipate the fate of losing. Moreover, if a party
chooses to take up arms after losing an election, it has to incur the cost of impend-
ing war in addition to the credibility cost among international audiences. There-
fore, the puzzle is: what motivates groups to take the violent route and reignite the
conflict once they participate in the elections?
The conflict literature points to two reasons for instability and conflict recur-
rence after a PCE: institutional weakness and the untimeliness of elections. First,
the institutional argument suggests that competition generates high intensity con-
flict and the institution in place, if poor, will not be able to placate it (Collier, Ho-
effler and Söderbom, 2008). We find that the term weak institution is used mainly
in two ways. More narrowly, it refers to the capacity and infrastructure to hold
free and fair elections. In broader terms, weak institution indicates to the lack of
democratic institutional mechanisms such as, bureaucracies, courts or other infras-
tructures, committing to reform which signals that the incumbent will not exploit
the victory and renege on the agreement to accommodate the opponents (McBride,
Milante and Skaperdas, 2011). In the context of first PCEs, the narrower definition
of institution—capacity to hold fair elections— is more apt since it is unlikely that
opponents will buy the incumbent’s commitment to broader reforms in the future.
However, the argument that weak state of institutions leads to recurrence of civil
war is not particularly sound since this does not explain the variation in outcome.
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In other words, prevalence of weak institution in a country ravaged with civil war
is true in almost all PCEs. The puzzle is, why some countries experience instability
after the first PCE and not others?
Second, few studies point to the election timing as the cause of conflict re-
currence. The main argument is that when PCEs are held early, the hostility level
is higher compared to when more time is provided to settle the animosity. This
makes it harder for former foes to trust each other and that the other will remain
committed to peace after the elections (Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). The basis
of this argument is institutional, as discussed above, that immature democracies
cannot sustain the high intensity competition that election induces. But the effect
of timing may be exogenous to electoral process. Other studies have observed that
immediate years after the end of conflicts, irrespective of whether or not an elec-
tion is held, are very risky in terms of recurrence of violence (Collier, Hoeffler and
Söderbom, 2008, p. 464; Snyder, 2000;Collier and Hoeffler,2004). This makes it
difficult to untangle the effect of timing from other election-related variables that
causes the risk of conflict recurrence to soar.
In summary, while democratization studies show that habituation because of
repeated elections lead a post-conflict country towards democratic stability, conflict
literature suggests that first elections are risky as they might push the country to-
wards conflict trap. Yet, the reason is unclear and there is much to explore why
this first elections increase the risk of conflict recurrence. I approach this puzzle by
focusing on the decision making of groups or parties during the PCE since it has
more bearing on the likelihood that they will stay on the chosen course later. In
other words, what factors motivate the parties to restart armed conflict once they
commit to compete in PCEs?
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4.3 Conditions of recurring conflict after PCE
Why do groups choose to fight? Can an election change the war equilibrium—that
is, inclination of groups to fight—to a peaceful political competition as envisaged?
Rationalist explanations posit that fighting is a function of three problems: informa-
tion problem, credible commitment, and issue indivisibility (Fearon, 1995; Powell,
2006). The first two are more relevant for this chapter especially since conflicts due
to issue indivisibility relate more to local or regional level elections and not to those
held at national level (see Höglund, Jarstad and Kovacs, 2009, p. 545). Below, I will
briefly elaborate the two rationalist perspectives, information problem and credible
commitment problem, which prevent actors from cooperating peacefully; followed
by a discussion on how they are applicable to the context of PCE.
First, problem of incomplete information states that conflicts arise as actors
bargain for the allocation of resources based on their military capability. The actors
have the incentive to misrepresent their capability in order to get a better deal in the
peaceful bargaining process. The alternative means to find out each others capabil-
ity is through fighting. War, therefore, is a costly means of communication (Fearon,
1995; Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007; Hirshleifer, 2000). According to this theory,
peaceful settlement is possible only when the information about each others capa-
bilities are fully revealed and players are ready to accept the deal accordingly. This
incomplete information approach however does not fully explain groups’ propen-
sity for violence in the context of post-conflict cases or cases of prolonged violent
conflicts, where they become aware of each other’s capability but are still inclined
to continue fighting.
Second, Powell (2006) points to another main problem in bargaining pro-
cesses that leads to fighting among groups: the problem of credible commitment to
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peace. The problem arises since committing to peace unilaterally does not ensure
similar level of commitment from the opponent. Groups therefore resort to continue
fighting. Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007, p. 680) further contribute by theorizing
the war equilibrium model, where both sides have the best utility in choosing to
fight, rather than any other alternative, whether they are (1) in fighting state, or
(2) in a state of negotiated settlement6 (see also Leventoglu and Slantchev, 2007).
While the first is quite intuitive, the second one, on why they choose to fight after
a negotiated settlement is linked to the main argument of this chapter and requires
further elaboration. Similar to Powell (2006), the authors first build a theoretical
model to show how credible commitment problem prevents belligerents to settle
peacefully. They argue that since the settlement deal cannot be enforced indefi-
nitely, players end up facing the problem of credible commitment, whether or not
the opponent will remain committed to peace. Similar to prisoners dilemma, the
shadow of the future in their model prevents the groups from cooperating peace-
fully.
Drawing from these rationalist logics, especially the latter, I expect to find
aftermath of violent conflicts risky in terms of conflict recurrence. Political insti-
tutions, according to institutionalists, help alleviate the commitment problem by
increasing the cost of cheating, creating prospect for future gains and rewarding ac-
tors that develop reputation for faithful adherence to agreements (Keohane, 1984).
Below, I discuss how elections can be helpful in changing the preferences of the ac-
tors and transform the war equilibria into peaceful ones. Moreover, since the level
of mass support for a group often represents its legitimacy and political power,
elections can also be helpful in revealing information about a groups capability.7
6That is, negotiated settlement without decisive victory
7This is quite a stretch as it suggests that military capability and political support are the same
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4.3.1 Self-enforcing democracy and the utility of PCE
Przeworski (2006) defines self-enforcing democracy as the equilibrium where peo-
ple and parties adhere to electoral results. The author argues that in the equilib-
rium, democratic government is retrained and made moderate by two constraints
not due to “some exogenous rules but for endogenous reasons: either because of the
rebellion or the electoral constraint, whichever bites first.” Prezeworski also warns
that the equilibrium can be disturbed due to events such as economic shocks, but,
in relation to the main argument of this chapter, the work does not tell us how such
equilibrium comes about in the first place. In other words, how can countries in
a state of any other equilibria, like conflict, can transform to a democratic equilib-
rium that is self-enforcing. Fearon (2011) builds on this theory and provides a more
detailed picture.
Self-enforcing democracy according to Fearon (2011) is the result of a credible
threat of protest or rebellion by the voting mass, if the incumbent does not hold
timely election. When held on time and the result of the election made public,
the mass acquires the incumbents private information about public support, once
again helping solve the coordination problem to rebel, if the ruler does not obey
the result. Elections thus work to produce a self-enforcing democracy.8
Extending Fearons model to post-conflict situation, we can think of a simple
model of how elections can help establish self-enforcing democracy. Let us consider
the three main players: the incumbent or the winner of the first post conflict elec-
thing. However, this is more so in the context of civil wars, where both groups vie for mass support,
as the literature on winning hearts and minds suggests. Cox (2009) presents a similar argument
that if authoritarian leaders do not hold elections for a long time, then they become unaware of the
opposition capability, often leading to their violent removal.
8A caveat however is the subtle electoral fraud by the incumbent. Fearon argues that with
subtle electoral fraud, the incumbent can manage to chip away the fairness of election resulting in
democratic reversals (2011: 1685).
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tions, the opposition and the civilian mass.9 As stated in the section above, credible
commitment problem hinders cooperation between opposition and incumbent. One
way to minimize such group insecurities according to scholars is through oversight
of peace agreements by external third parties, making it costlier for contenders to
renege on their peaceful commitmentsWalter (2009). Voting mass in an election
can play similar third party role in a post-conflict country.
Armed violence is costly to public mass and are therefore they are likely to
support parties that make the effort to build peace. Moreover, parties have the in-
centive of getting a better deal in the future. Therefore, elections when held fairly,
can incentivize former belligerents to remain committed to peace and increase the
prospect of public support in future. In other words, elections, in theory, should
work in preventing the recurrence of armed conflict. This is important since elec-
tions are the foundational institution that sets the self-enforcing mechanism rolling.
Contrary to such ideal scenario, election irregularities by the parties delegitimizes
the electoral institution. Without legitimacy, elections lose the institutional power
to check parties from reneging on the peace deals. In the section below, I hypoth-
esize how two forms of electoral irregularities, pre-election violence and election
day fraud, lead to increased risk of conflict recurrence.
4.3.2 Pre-electoral violence: Selective or indiscriminate?
At the outset, it seems obvious that pre-election violence by one contending party
against another lead to tit-for-tat response and spiraling violence. However, such
indiscriminate violence is less common once parties agree to stop the conflict and
contend elections. Former warring parties are more likely to use violence selectively
9The assumption is that the incumbent and the opposition represent groups that participated in
the past conflict, which is often the case.
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and strategically targeting civilian voters rather than opponents. In contrast to the
free-riding argument that civilians take sides with the winning factions attracted by
the spoils of victory, Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) highlight the trend of how armed
groups coerce and intimidate non-combatants to join them. The authors explain
that people tend to take side not because others are participating, but because non-
participation in civil war scenario is risky and that collective action problem applies
only if insurgent collective action is risky relative to non-participation (2007:179).
More striking is the empirical study of Mason and Krane (1989), who argue that
the use of coercion can generate popular support. Analyzing events of state vio-
lence in El Salvador, they find that state used selective violence and intimidation to
generate popular support. When violence by state was indiscriminate, they show
that popular support shifted towards the opposition. However, when the state used
violence selectively, the sense of fear increased the level of popular support for the
state. More recently, Wood (2010) argues in similar vein that strategic violence
used by rebels against civilians and the fear that it creates boosts support for the
rebels.
These works show that political groups during the times of armed conflict
commonly use selective violence to exert coercive control and garner popular sup-
port. We expect this pattern to be even more pronounced during pre-election pe-
riod, as parties are careful not to escalate costly conflict but mobilize voters using
resource they possess since war years. As a result, we expect to find lower level
violence rather than indiscriminate ones, since the actors are careful to avoid a full-
fledged costly escalation by targeting opponents. In other words, rather than indis-
criminate and lethal violence against the opponent members, groups are likely to
use lower scale violence such as threats, abductions, beatings or assassinations, to
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terrorize the voters, which often do not make headlines in major international me-
dia. Scholars working to build data on electoral violence acknowledge this problem
and address the issue by generating ordinal scale measures of pre-election violence
by qualitatively analyzing reports, rather than counting events reported by the me-
dia.10 This also means that we should see lower level violence during pre-election
period when the context is post-conflict, compared to pre-election violence in reg-
ular countries. A quick look at the Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED)
data presented in table 4.1 reinforces this claim (Raleigh et al., 2010). Analyzing
all African elections between 1997-2007, we find that post-conflict elections are
preceded by much lower level fatalities than regular elections. While systematic
empirical evidence to check this assumption can make a good research in itself,
this evidence shows the ironic result that post-conflict elections are associated with
lower level of pre-electoral violence compared to regular elections. Yet, despite
the lower scale violence in post-conflict countries, I explain below how presence of
pre-election violence lead to increased risk for conflict recurrence later.
Table 4.1: Comparing Pre-election Violence Fatalities in Africa
Elections n Mean
Regular 110 262.65
Post-conflict 17 74
Difference (p<0.05)
Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED)
10See Strauss and Taylor (2012)
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Figure 4.1: Pre-election violence in Africa 1997-2007
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4.3.3 Lower legitimacy and violence after PCE
Pre-election violence and intimidation can increase the risk of conflict recurrence
in two main ways. Losing party in such elections can directly challenge the elec-
tion result or raise any other minority issues and create a political impasse in order
to push towards another election. For instance, post conflict periods in countries
like Iraq in 2004 and Nepal in 2008, face tremendous challenge of accommodating
the divergent interest of domestic groups that are often zero sum in nature while
providing opportunities for oppositions to capitalize these issues to overthrow the
incumbents (Ottaway, 2009; The Economist, 2011). The incumbent too has the
option to choose either a more repressive measure or comply to hold violence free
election, depending on its belief about how much support it actually has from the
people. If subsequent election takes place, it is likely to be either very violent or
completely free of violence. Nepal’s election in 2012 following the post-conflict
election in 2008, is an example of the latter. The Maoists party gained overwhelm-
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ing seats following the first PCE but election monitoring reports suggest the pres-
ence of rampant pre-electoral violence and intimidation by the party (Carter Center
Report, 2008). In the subsequent election, the party did not use pre-election vio-
lence after the overwhelming support in the earlier elections. The election in 2012
was free of violence and intimidation, but the Maoists lost badly.
In summary, pre-election violence can serve as the basis for the conflict recur-
rence on following three grounds. First, it masks the true preferences of people.
The losing parties are more likely to challenge the result and incumbent position
on the ground that the outcome could be in their favor if the election was fair. In
other words, pre-electoral violence and intimidation serve as the barrier to infor-
mation regarding true popular support, and provides incentive for the losing party
to challenge the electoral results.
Second, as a result of electoral misconduct and the uncertainty, the neutral
third party arbitration by people loses its meaning. When there is pre-election vi-
olence, for instance, irrespective of which side perpetrates, two following mutual
mechanisms work to increase the probability of violence onset later. On the one
hand, when pre-electoral violence is predominantly by an incumbent party, the los-
ing oppositions are likely to choose the tough resistance approach to challenge and
oust the incumbent. Since the prospect of better result in fairer election remains
much high, groups are prepared to challenge the results using violence. Moreover,
odds of attracting voters due to its moral stand and the legitimacy is fairly high.
On the other hand, if the pre-electoral violence is by an opposition, the incumbent
should find it easy to justify the use of repressive means thus escalating the situ-
ation. The recent case of violence outbreak in Ivory Coast is the perfect example,
where widespread condemnation of election fraud by incumbent president Laurent
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Gbagbo led the opposition party to initiate the armed conflict in March 2011.11
Either way, violence is likely to escalate.
Third, electoral misconducts lower the legitimacy of the winners. While such
lack of legitimacy may not be catastrophic in most regular democracies,12 post-
conflict situations remain vulnerable due to numerous high stake issues that oppo-
sition can capitalize upon and escalate the tension, as discussed above. Literature
on coups d’etat show that lack of legitimacy is one of the key conditions to over-
throw the incumbents (Belkin and Schofer, 2003). In such situations, repressive
measures taken by the incumbent to thwart anticipated coup attempts by the oppo-
sition can flare the violence.
One potential concern is that pre-election violence and recurrence of conflict
later might be endogenous in the sense that they both are caused by the same latent
cause. However, if this is the case, then we should witness eruption of conflict dur-
ing the election when the competition is at its peace, and not later. While hostility
level remains high in all post-conflict cases, the mechanism outlined above sug-
gests that it is the event of pre-election violence that causes the outcome of armed
conflicts later.
Therefore, we expect the following:
H1: As the incidence of pre-electoral violence in the first PCE increases, there
should be higher likelihood for conflict recurrence after the election.
11The Economist.2011, March. “Fighting in Cote dIvoire Shifting Lines” no. 8725, (March 19,
2011): 56 (Available: http://www.economist.com/node/18400458)
12Daxecker’s (2012) analysis of African cases show how election monitors reports on electoral
fraud can facilitate collective action problem among mass, leading to violent movements. Tucker
(2007) argues similarly by examining the cases of post-communist countries.
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4.3.4 Election Fraud
Electoral fraud is similar to pre-election violence, mainly in its effect. Parties con-
tending the PCE see it as the one-shot game that can make or break the war effort
and are therefore likely to indulge in fraudulent activities, such as proxy voting and
capturing ballot boxes. Since cost of engaging in fraudulent activities may not be as
high as using coercion—that is the danger of escalating into a full scale civil war—
we expect to see more instances of electoral fraud in PCEs. Weidmann and Callen
(2013) argue similarly and show by analyzing the 2009 election in Afghanistan
that when the level of violence is high, there are less electoral fraud incidents, but
when the level of violence is low, there are more incidents of electoral fraud, which
eventually taper off as countries develop and consolidate the democratic practice.
In summary, actors are likely to engage in election fraud in PCEs. The mechanism
of how fraudulent elections lower the legitimacy of the electoral institution and the
rise of opposition challenge is similar to the discussion above, leading to the follow-
ing hypothesis:
H2: As the incidence of electoral fraud in the first PCE increases, there should be
a higher likelihood of conflict recurrence after the election.
4.4 Research Design
I test the above hypotheses using cross-national longitudinal data of all countries
from 1950 to 2010. The unit of analysis is country-year for which I use event history
analysis as the appropriate statistical method. The dependent variable is binary,
signifying absence or presence of violence in a post conflict country. A country
enters the dataset in the year when the first PCE is held. After entering the dataset,
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all subsequent country-years without violence are counted as one peace episode
and the dependent variable is coded as 0. If violent conflict occurs anytime during
the peace episode, the dependent variable is coded as 1 and the country is taken
out of the data set. From 1950 to 2010, for instance, a country may have more than
one peace episode.
Researchers face two main challenges when coding peace episodes. First,
there may be more than one ongoing conflict in a country followed by different
levels of elections. Which conflict and election do we choose as the start of a peace
episode? In an earlier study, Brancati and Snyder (2013) consider each conflict
episode as unique and regard any election after the end of a violent armed conflict
as the PCE, irrespective of any other ongoing conflicts in the country.13 In this chap-
ter, I take a slightly different approach since conflicts within the same set of borders
are often related to similar factors (Akcinaroglu, 2012). I therefore consider an
election as the first PCE and code the election year as the start of a peace episode,
only when all armed conflicts in the country have ended. I consider only the presi-
dential or legislative elections at national level, whichever occurs first after the end
of conflicts, as the first PCE. I use the PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset for informa-
tion on armed conflicts across states and the National Elections Across Democracy
and Autocracy (NELDA) version 3 for all election related information (Hyde and
Marinov, 2012).
Second, a common problem in the study of armed conflict is determining the
right threshold: what is the threshold of violence to define a case as armed conflict
and include it in the data? If we use the higher threshold of 1000 battle related
13If a country has more than one violent conflicts going on simultaneously, say conflict A and
B, the authors code an election as the first PCE after the end of conflict A, even when conflict B is
ongoing.
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deaths per year, we overlook a number of recurring conflict cases that suffer battle
deaths below the 1000 threshold but still generating higher costs like 900 battle
related deaths per year. I therefore use the minimalist definition of armed conflict
as defined in the PRIO dataset 25 or more battle related deaths per year (Gled-
itsch et al., 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2013). One downside of using the
low threshold is that it captures even smaller or regional based conflicts which may
not have the same level of relevancy associated with the national level elections as
larger scale civil wars. For instance, if the conflict is peripheral or regional, electoral
conditions at the central or national level is likely to have a very weak influence on
the restart of the conflict. To illustrate it further, armed conflict in the North East
part of India is least likely to affect its national level elections. Therefore, the na-
tional elections if held after the end of that particular conflict cannot be claimed as
the post-conflict election in a meaningful way. In general, such territorial conflicts
are closely associated with more local level elections or regional politics than cen-
tral or national level elections (Cederman, Hug and Krebs, 2010; Höglund, Jarstad
and Kovacs, 2009). The variable Incompatibility in the Armed Conflict dataset dis-
tinguishes between the territorial conflicts and national conflicts fought over gov-
ernance issues. Since this analysis focuses on national level elections, this variable
is an important control measure theoretically.14
The main independent variables for this study are the two types of election
irregularities in the first PCE: electoral fraud and pre-election violence. A draw-
back of the election irregularity data is the lack of preciseness in terms of scale
or intensity. This is especially true for countries in post conflict periods, since the
infrastructure necessary to record the details of these events are likely to be non-
14I discuss in the later section how the results are robust when we use all cases controlling for
this variable or when excluding the territorial conflicts altogether.
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existent and election monitors are not present in all such elections. This is one of
the main reasons why datasets on cross-national election code election irregulari-
ties in either binary or ordinal scales based on qualitative reports and documents15
(Hyde and Marinov, 2012; Kelley, 2012; Strauss and Taylor, 2012). I use the two
variables from NELDA dataset. It codes pre-electoral violence variable as 1 if there
is any election related violence immediately before, during or immediately after
the election; and similarly codes variable election fraud based on the election day
reports of the election monitors (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). While indicating the
presence of election irregularities, it is necessary that we take care not to exagger-
ate the effects of the two variables by coding them as 1 throughout the entire period
after the first PCE, if there is presence of election irregularities only during the first
PCE but not in the elections thereafter. I therefore code variable pre-election vio-
lence or election fraud as 1 when present in the first PCE for all following years
until when no such event occurs in the subsequent election, after which it is coded
as 0. In Sri Lanka for instance, there was an armed insurrection by Janatha Vimuk-
thi Peramuna (JVP) in 1971 causing 1260 battle related deaths according to PRIO
estimate. The first election after the event was six years later in 1977, the year that
the country enters the data. Coding this event, the dependent variable takes the
value of 0 until the conflict recurs in 1984, when it is coded as 1 (See figure 4.2).
If a country enters the data after the first PCE but does not return to conflict,
the dependent variable is considered right censored and is coded as 0 for all years
after its entry. According to NELDA, Sri Lanka experienced pre-election violence
preceding the 1977 election but not during the subsequent 1982 election (no elec-
tion fraud in both). As explained in figure 4.2, the variable pre-election violence for
15Strauss and Taylor (2012) use ordinal scale to code pre-election violence but their data set is
limited to Africa and only for years after 1990.
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Figure 4.2: Coding dependent variable conflict recurrence and main independent
variable pre-election violence using Sri Lanka case
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the country is coded as 1 after 1977 until the second election in 1982, after which
the variable is coded as 0.
4.5 Control Variables
Researchers have identified few important structural factors responsible for conflict
onset. It is important that we control for them in order to isolate the confounding
factors responsible for conflict recurrence in the later years. Wealth of a country is
often cited as the reason for the onset of conflicts. To measure a country’s wealth,
I use the logged value of real GDP in 2000 US dollars (in millions) from Gleditsch
and Ward’s 1999 updated dataset. Also used from the same dataset is the next
control variable, population of a country. Similar to wealth, ethnic fractionalization
also impacts the onset of conflict and countries with higher level of ethnic fraction-
alization are considered risky. I therefore use variable ethnic fractionalization from
the updated dataset of Alesina et. al. (2003) that has fractionalization measures
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for 190 countries from 1946-2012.
How conflicts ended in the past can have direct bearing on the likelihood of
armed conflict in the future. Compared to any other conflict outcomes, studies indi-
cate that countries are likely to be more peaceful after a decisive victory by one side
(David Mason et al., 2011; Licklider, 1995; Luttwak, 1999). Using Kreutz (2010)
dataset, I code variable victory as 1 if the conflict ended with decisive victory by
one side and 0 otherwise. The number of people that died or the cost of past war
can also influence the durability of peace later (Zartman, 2003). To measure the
human cost of war, I use battle related deaths from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005).
If a country has more than one ongoing conflicts in a given year, then this variable
represents the sum of battle related deaths in all ongoing conflicts in the country.
In terms of electoral system, the two main popular ones are majoritarian and pro-
portional electoral system. While some argue that majoritarian elections lowers the
probability of intergroup conflict by binding voters across different cross-cutting
cleavages, others find that proportional representation system provides a better in-
stitutional framework as it incentivizes groups to join political dialog (Horowitz,
1985; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Lijphart, 1969). I use data on the two types of
electoral systems in the main model from Bormann and Golder (2013). Another
relevant finding of past studies is that conflicts are likely to recur in post conflict
countries when elections are held early. I control for the count of years after the end
of conflict until when a PCE is held. Presence of UN peacekeeping operations in a
country can also affect the likelihood of peace. I code UN peacekeeping as a binary
variable using the data from UN Department of Peacekeeping website.16 Finally, I
control for the presence of election monitors using a variable from NELDA dataset.
16Details on the UN peacekeeping missions since 1948 are summarized in:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf [accessed January 2015]
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4.6 Statistical model
To examine how election irregularities affect political stability after PCE, I use the
event history model or the survival model. To restate the basic framework of the
model, a country enters the dataset after the first PCE and exits the dataset with
the recurrence of violence or if violence does not recur until the year 2010. Each
country may have one or more peace spells within the period from 1950 to 2010. To
account for the repeated peace spells in the same country, results are clustered by
country. I use the gompertz parametric model17 to estimate the hazard or risk. The
choice of Gompertz distribution is based on the theoretical expectation that hazard
of conflict recurrence should decrease over time. Generalized gamma test rules out
the possibility that the shape of the hazard is weibull, thus leaving gompertz to be
the closest fit (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Jenkins, 2005).18
In general, there are 123 peace episodes in 60 countries from 1950 to 2010.
55 of these 123 peace episodes fail. These numbers shrink to 78 peace episodes in
48 countries, when we examine only countries governance incompatibility conflicts,
and exclude the territorial ones. On average, the duration of wars before elections
in these countries are 4.6 years, with standard deviation of 5.9 years. However,
exceptional cases are countries like Guatemala, United Kingdom, Cambodia, South
Africa and Iraq that experienced post-conflict elections after experiencing conflicts
for more than 20 years. Since UCDP dataset provides the start and end of armed
conflicts by month, I also code conflicts that occur in the same year ut few months
after the elections. Some examples of countries where conflicts recur at a later
17Frailty model shows no unobserved heterogeneity in the model. I do not expect the proportional
hazard due to pre-election violence and fraud to remain constant over time; I expect it to decrease,
thus not ideal for semi parametric cox model. However, using time varying covariates in cox model,
the main variables of interest pre-election violence and election fraud are statistically significant.
18Weibull model also provides similar result
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date in the same year after first PCE are Azerbaijan 1995, Congo 2002, DRC 2006,
Angola 1992, Cambodia 1993 and Afghanistan 2009.
4.7 Findings
The main hypotheses seek to test the effect of election irregularities on the risk of
conflict recurrence after first PCE. Results of the event history analysis is reported
in table 4.2, where the coefficients are the hazard ratios. If a variable has hazard
ratio greater than 1, then it signifies that increasing the unit of the variable, ceteris
paribus, causes the risk of conflict recurrence to increase. Hazard ratio below 1 on
the other hand has opposite effect.
The two main explanatory variables are pre-election violence and election
fraud, and since they are significantly correlated with each other,19 I first test them
separately, and then together in the full model. Models 3 and 4 are the main mod-
els since both exclude territorial or nationalist conflicts tend to associate less with
national level elections, as explained in the theory section. As a measure to check
robustness, model 1 and 2 include all cases but use type of conflict as a control
variable.
As expected, we find that pre-election violence has a strong influence on the
risk of conflict recurrence. Compared to countries without pre-election violence,
on average and controlling for other variables in the model, a country with pre-
election violence before the first PCE has a 165 percent higher risk of returning
to conflict. For electoral fraud, the risk is 108 percent higher. We find in models
1 and 2 that the effect of pre-election violence continues to remain strong even
19Correlation coefficient = .304 at p<0.01
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Table 4.2: Risk of conflict recurrence after PCE, 1950-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Governance Governance Governance
Incomp Incomp Incomp
Pre-election violence 2.41*** 2.65*** 2.41**
(2.74) (2.70) (2.10)
Election fraud 1.68 2.08* 1.26
(1.34) (1.68) (0.45)
Battle related deaths 0.88** 0.89** 0.92 0.93 0.92
(-2.51) (-2.36) (-1.56) (-1.35) (-1.49)
PR election 0.91 0.93 0.70 0.73 0.70
(-0.32) (-0.26) (-1.11) (-0.94) (-1.08)
Victory outcome 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.96 0.91
(-0.58) (-0.42) (-0.34) (-0.14) (-0.28)
Electoral monitors 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.76
(-0.86) (-0.75) (-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.83)
No. of years (since last conflict) 0.90** 0.90** 0.91** 0.91** 0.91**
(-2.53) (-2.38) (-2.10) (-1.98) (-2.09)
Population (log) 1.65*** 1.60** 1.38 1.36 1.38
(2.67) (2.46) (1.38) (1.31) (1.37)
GDP (log) 0.68*** 0.70** 0.76 0.78 0.76
(-2.72) (-2.51) (-1.62) (-1.45) (-1.59)
UN peacekeeping 1.46 1.42 2.14 2.00 2.01
(0.82) (0.76) (1.50) (1.33) (1.32)
Ethnic fractionalization 2.60* 2.55* 2.27 2.26 2.25
(1.85) (1.77) (1.45) (1.41) (1.43)
Incompatibility 0.77 0.79
(-0.82) (-0.75)
Constant 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 0.08** 0.09*
(-1.90) (-1.90) (-1.88) (-2.00) (-1.92)
Observations 1,176 1,176 971 971 971
ll -157.7 -160.2 -126.3 -128.2 -126.2
chi2 31.80 26.79 23.98 20.11 24.18
p 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.03 0.01
z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Table above shows the risks of conflict recurrence after the first post-conflict elections
(PCE). The coefficients are the hazard ratios from event history model. The dependent variable
is whether or not a country returns to violence after the first post-conflict elections. The first two
models include types of intra-state conflicts, territorial or government incompatibility as defined
in UCDP armed conflict dataset, as control variable. Models 3 and 4 are the main models that
include only conflicts that are governance incompatibility.
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Figure 4.3: Risk of conflict recurrence after first post conflict elections
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Note: The figure displays the predicted risk of conflict recurrence from estimates of models
(3) and (4) in Table 3. It shows that risk is almost three times higher in the presence of
pre-election violence and almost twice as high in the presence of electoral fraud,
controlling for all other predictors in the models.
when we include cases with territorial conflicts. Variable election fraud is significant
at p<0.1 only in the main model and loses significance after adding cases with
territorial conflicts. The substantive effects of the two variables are displayed in
figure 4.3. Ceteris paribus, we find that the presence of pre-election violence and
election fraud increases the risk of conflict recurrence. The effect of pre-election
violence is stronger than electoral fraud. Overall, we have strong evidence to show
that election irregularities in post-conflict countries can increase the risk of conflict
recurrence after the election.
The finding on pre-electoral violence has important implications since it sug-
gests that the pre-election period has an important impact on post-election violence
and thus democratic stability later. Election monitors often focus on the election day
violence and ignore the violent intimidation that precedes election day. Using em-
pirical study on cross-national level elections, Kelley (2012) finds that pre-electoral
violence is often ignored by election monitors as they fear igniting tension if they
report such pre-election violence as critical, when no violence is observed on the
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main election day. She calls this “stability bias” where election monitors under re-
port the pre-election violence. As noted by the author, election monitors do report
the pre-election violence but understate the gravity of the problem because of the
bias and endorse the election as long as there are no visible violent events on the
election day. The findings here augment Kelleys work as it shows how pre-election
violence in PCEs can have a negative consequence.
Let us now analyze two different case studies to evaluate the empirical find-
ings by examining two PCE cases in Africa, Angola 1992 and Mozambique 1994,
where violence recurred only in the former but not the latter. Analyzing the reports
of election monitors, we find evidence of pre-election irregularities in Angola by
both the incumbent MPLA and the opposition UNITA. A report of the 1992 election
was prepared by International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) after dis-
patching 39 IFES observers to 400 of Angolas 5579 polling stations. The observers
visited these locations just 3 days before the election day and gathered information
on the political context covering a period of about 6 months before the election
day. The IFES report states that both the parties filed complaint alleging the other
of fraud and intimidation in a number of areas. On the one hand, the Angolan gov-
ernment complained that parties could not campaign freely in the South Eastern
part of the Angola, which was under UNITA control. On the other hand, UNITA
“registered frequent complaints with the government about the high visibility and
the potential intimidation effect of the blue uniformed riot police or the Ninjas”
(Bayer, 1992, p. 16).20 They also complained that their supporters were harassed
and intimidated in many provinces and that UNITA campaign headquarters were at-
20UNITA further complained that “registration of voters was halted before as many as one million
eligible voters were able to register, particularly in its areas of support. UNITA differed with the
CNE’s [Commission for National Election] estimate of 5.3 million eligible voters, favoring instead a
total of 6.16 million eligible voters” (1992:16).
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tacked in many MPLA strongholds including Malange. While allegations like these
not uncommon, we should note that these complaints were lodged prior to the
counting of votes and although detailed event logs for these incidents is difficult to
obtain, there is consistency about the allegations in various reports.21 In compari-
son, Mozambiques pre-electoral phase during the 1994 PCE was reported as being
“surprisingly peaceful” (Haines and Wood, 1995, p. 362). Later, Angola returned
to violence but Mozambique was able to sustain the peace.This anecdotal evidence
lends credence to the main claim of this chapter that pre-election irregularity in-
creases the risk of conflict recurrence.
The estimated effects of some of the control variables are also worth noting,
even though they are not the primary focus of this study. In terms of election timing,
we confirm the results of past studies. The numbers of years between the end of
conflict and the election has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant,
suggesting that the risk of conflict recurrence is higher when the elections are held
earlier. Compared to elections held in the first year, we find that the risk is less by
almost half in those countries where the first election is held in the 5th year, and
less by almost 3 times in elections held in the 8th year. Yet, there are other factors
that dampen or increase risk. The first two models show that cost of past conflict
in terms of battle death lowers the risk of conflict recurrence. The relationship
is non-linear as the measure is log transformed battle deaths. We find that one
unit increase in the log of battle deaths lowers the risk of conflict recurrence by 10
percent at p<0.1. Substantively, this result from the first two models means that
compared to a country that saw approximately 3000 battle deaths (log 8) before
the election, a country with nearly 5000 battle deaths (log 9) has 10% less risk of
21Strauss and Taylor (2012) categorize Angola 1992 election as having occasional but large scale
pre-election violence
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conflict recurrence. For comparison among lower level conflicts, a country where
55 people died in violent conflicts (log 4) has 10% more risk of conflict recurrence
than another country that suffered approximately 150 battle related deaths (log5).
Why this might be so is unclear since as stated by Walter (2004, p. 377), costs
of war such as battle-related deaths may increase either the desire for revenge or
the war fatigue, and the evidence here suggests the latter. However, battle related
deaths is not statistically significant in main models 3 and 4, similar to Walter’s
(2004) findings.
GDP has similar dampening effect, whiceh again is a log transformed variable.
From model 1, We find that 1 unit increase in the variable lowers the risk of conflict
recurrence by nearly 30%. In more substantive terms, if we compare the lower
quartiles of GDP log in two countries, we find that a country with the GDP of 3.6 bn
US dollars (log8.2) has 30% less risk of conflict recurrence than that with the GDP
of 9.9 bn dollars (log 9.2).The comparison is close to the GDP of two post-conflict
countries in Africa in the 1990s, Sierra Leone and Mozambique respectively. After
the first PCE, conflict recurred only in the former that had lower GDP. Yet, the
effects of both the dampening variables, battle deaths and GDP, are not as strong
as the opposite effects of the election irregularities. Finally, another variable that
has strong effect on conflict recurrence is the outcome of victory. This result is in
accordance with past study (Quinn, Mason and Gurses, 2007) and shows that we
are less likely to see recurrence of conflict when elections are held after one side
wins the war. Model 4 indicates that the risk decreases by about 70%, when the PCE
is held after the outcome of victory. Overall, the findings show that we are able to
predict the likelihood of conflict recurrence in future by examining the conditions
surrounding a PCE.
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4.8 Conclusion
First PCE are important events that mark a new beginning after the end of violent
armed conflicts. This chapter provided a systematic analysis to show how election
irregularities in PCEs can increase the risk of conflict recurrence later. We find that
PCEs are acutely sensitive to such irregularities. For instance, I have discussed in
the chapter that the levels of pre-election violence in PCEs are generally low. On
average, they are close to half the pre-election violence levels in regular countries.
This low level pre-election violence may perhaps be one of the reasons that elec-
tion monitors tend to under report such events as shown by Kelley (2012). This
study contributes by highlighting the grave consequence that follow such election
irregularities no matter how low they appear when compared to regular elections.
The study therefore highlights the need for policymakers to pay more attention to
pre-election period long before the actual election day, in order to sustain the peace.
This study also opens up several interesting questions for future research un-
dertakings. First, a theoretical contribution in future would be to encapsulate the
process through dynamic modeling of events. How do variables escalate or lower
the risk, as the actors anticipate each other’s move? Second, the chapter does not
scrutinize the role of specific actors. For instance, it is still not clear how the risk of
conflict recurrence would be impacted if more or less number of groups or factions
that were a part of the past conflict contended in a post-conflict election. Finally,
another important strand of study would be to analyze political behavior not only at
individual level but also at elite level. Research in this direction would be relevant
directly to the policy-makers.
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Chapter 5 Policy implications and concluding remarks
5.1 The Coercive nature of violence in post-conflict election
Terminations of armed conflicts and civil wars are important events for host-nation
governments, and for international actors that have a stake in peace and stability
of the country. Equally important is to ensure that the peace becomes sustainable.
According to bargaining literature on armed conflicts, the cumulative cost of war
has a prominent role in warring parties’ decisions to deescalate conflicts and engage
in a peaceful dialog (Fearon, 1995; Zartman, 2003). The decision to terminate con-
flicts, along with the decisions to contend in national elections once peace ensues,
is key in the process of conflict termination and building sustainable peace. While
the parties continue to harbor doubts about opponents’ commitment to peace, they
choose to contend in elections when they find that this is a relatively less costly
path compared to continuing the armed conflict.
As a consequence of this bargaining process during the conflict termination
phase, the nature of electoral violence in post-conflict elections is coercive rather
than competitive. This is in contrast to electoral violence in non-postconflict coun-
tries, where such events are the results of competitive mobilization that political
parties pursue in a specific geographical territory. When parties are competing,
opposition party members often become the targets of violence, causing violence
to expand beyond the geographical area. An example of the competitive electoral
violence is when party affiliations run along ethnic lines, generating polarization
and intense out-group hatred and in-group unity (Posen, 1993). Such inter-party
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competition that peaks during electoral periods is strongly linked to violent protests
and inter-ethnic clashes, as seen in India between the Hindus and the Muslims. Ac-
cording to Wilkinson (2004, p. 172), parties aiming to mobilize lower caste Hindu
voters in Northern India used extreme Hindu nationalist narratives, which created
intense hostility against the Muslims. Leading Hindu parties like the Bharatiya
Janata Party showed a willingness to confront the competitors in order to mobilize
the followers, creating what Tilly (2003) describes as the mechanism of boundary
activation. I argue in this study that such a competitive electoral violence is not
usually the case in post-conflict elections.
Elections in post-conflict countries to some extent intensify the competitive
atmosphere. However, the likelihood of violence due to such competition alone
is somewhat less in post-conflict elections compared to regular elections. This is
because any act of violence against the other group in a post-conflict context is
likely to escalate and re-ignite a full fledged armed conflict, which is precisely the
cost that former combatants want to avoid when agreeing to terminate the conflict
and participate in such elections. In other words, post-conflict elections become the
fine line where parties do not want to resume the armed conflict and yet are on the
verge of it because of the distrust they harbor from the past. In this context, parties
compete to amass votes but are often careful not to resume hostilities. Therefore, if
and when contending parties choose to use violence, it is primarily against civilians
in a certain geographical area, aiming to achieve control rather than to drive the
opponent out of an area. In other words, rather than competitive violence, post-
conflict election violence is coercive, with the purpose of controlling the voting
mass.
The last three chapters of this dissertation explained the effects of violence
114
on individuals’ political attitudes and voting preferences. Built on psychological
studies, the main theory suggested that individuals are more likely to make anti-
democratic political choices when they are under the threat of violence. This is
because at such times, they are more likely to value security, order and survivabil-
ity than freedom and liberty. I argued and provided evidence that this need for
security leads people to support groups or parties that they perceive will prevent
the violence from re-occurring. However, quite the contrary to an individual’s per-
ception, electing a “strong” party only increases the likelihood of armed conflict
recurrence. These findings are further echoed in Bekoe (2012, p. 244), where she
sums up that election times in sub-Saharan Africa are delicate, since even a small
scale pre-election violence can have a long term impact on democratization and
sustainable peacebuilding.
5.2 Gaps for Future Research
Two puzzles that surface from this study require further investigation. First, this
study focused on individual preferences as the consequence of fear and anxiety,
but not on an equally important emotion, anger. An assumption in this study is
that civilians in post-conflict contexts are more likely to be fearful of the conflict,
having suffered the cost of war. Because of such fear, I argued that voters in post-
conflict countries are likely to prefer extreme parties to moderate ones. I used
the exploratory study of Nepal where voters chose the Maoist Party fearing that
the party would return to violence upon losing the election.1 The more fearful
they were of the Maoist pre-election violence, I found a higher degree of voter
support for the same Maoist party that were perpetrating the violence. However, I
1Which was also the case in Liberian election in 1997
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expect this mechanism, say mechanism 1, to be different from mechanism in ethnic
conflicts where hostility is not limited to elite party members but runs at a deeper
societal level that includes individual voters (mechanism 2). In other words, when
citizens become part of the conflict as in mechanism 2, political support should be
greater for the leadership or group that seeks to aggressively fight or punish the
opponent—the more fearful they are of violence from the opponent, they should be
more likely to support aggresive leader that can punish the opponent group or the
perpetrator. Yet, a common consequence in both the mechanisms is that citizens
are more likely to prefer “strong” parties, although for different reasons: citizens
in mechanism 1 are driven by fear and anxiety whereas those in mechanism 2 are
driven by anger and aggression. Future research could investigate the nuances
between the two mechanisms.
Second, the main argument in the study is that risks of conflict recurrence
increases with pre-election violence because stronger parties get elected in such
fearful contexts. However, the study does not provide evidence for this association
between pre-election violence and the emergence of strong parties at crossnational
level. Instead, it uses exploratory case study of Nepal and other previous works
(Lyons, 1999) as evidence. Future research can test the external validity of the
finding from the study with crossnational data of post-conflict elections.
Despite the limitations, evidence provided in the study supports the theory
that fear of violence among individuals has a substantive effect on their anti-democratic
political attitudes. As such, the presence of pre-election violence in the first post-
conflict elections of a country increases the risk of conflict recurrences, as anti-
democratic forces come to the political fore. This finding has an important policy
implication for democratization after armed conflicts through electoral means. It
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highlights the importance of a voter’s “sense of security” during a pre-election pe-
riod for paving way to a peaceful and sustainable democratic process. In the fol-
lowing section, I discuss what this means for policymakers and international actors
who have a stake in the peacebuilding process and in the long term stability of a
post-conflict country, and a set of actions that should be taken to improve the sense
of security among the voters.
5.3 Policy Implications: Security by whom and by what means?
Past works on conflict termination and peacebuilding focus on warring parties, an-
alyzing what it takes to bring them to peace with each other. In this study, I shifted
the gaze to voting citizens in post-conflict countries and their role in building sus-
tainable peace through elections. In doing so, I sought to uncover the full potential
of the conflict resolution capacity of the democratic process. Stated briefly, the
main policy-relevant message of the study is that in post-conflict elections, we need
to pay attention to the sense of security of voters and ensure that they are casting
their votes in a relatively secure environment. Since citizens in post-conflict coun-
tries are more sensitive to violence compared to others, we have discussed in the
preceding chapters that even minor fear-inducing activities by contending parties
can have substantial effects on the voting behavior of the citizens, increasing their
support towards a more violent or strong parties.
I discuss four different measures to build pre-electoral civilian protection in
a country out of armed conflicts: (1) Disarmament and demobilization of combat-
ants, (2) third party peacekeeping intervention with a mandate to protect civilians,
(3) strengthening civil society for greater political accountability, and (4) deploy-
ments of election monitors at least six months prior to the election. The proposed
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four measures are not novel and different combinations of these measures are found
at various stages of many ongoing and past post-conflict cases. What I propose
differently here is that these four measures should be geared specifically to ad-
dress pre-election security challenges. Such election-oriented measures will uphold
civilian protection at various levels, helping to kick-start a sustainable democratic
process in a more efficient manner compared to current practices.
5.3.1 Disarmament and demoblization of combatants
Demobilizing ex-combatants not only signals the commitment of peace to the op-
posing former warring parties, but also to citizens. This is usually negotiated as a
part of the peace agreement process. However, the parties have incentives to re-
frain from demobilizing their combatants at least until the elections. This was the
case in Nepal where both the former rebel group and the government forces agreed
to disarm and restrict movement of their troops.2 However, the disarmed weapons
were locked in containers located in different cantonment areas where the combat-
ants (both rebel and equivalent size of government troops) remained intact. Rather
than demobilization, the combatants continued to remain under the hierarchical
structure of the conflict years. Moreover, higher-level experienced combatants in
the former rebel group were excluded from the disarmament process and were in
the leading positions of the youth group, Young Communist League, that were ac-
tive during the election time (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012, 17). While Nepal has not
returned to armed violence, the level of democracy and governance has remained
poor, with a handful of violent incidents during the second post-conflict elections in
2013. In 2015, at least 23 people died in an unrest related to political differences
2According to Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies
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and party stances when drafting the new Constitution.3
In contrast, El Salvador had a similar 12-year long armed conflict that ended
in 1992, but the disarmament process was more efficient. The size of the national
army was reduced from 63,175 to almost half its size by mid-1993, while the former
rebel group FMLN, demobilized all of their 12,362 combatants in 1992 (Arnson
and Azpuru, 2008). Comparing few cases of post-conflict elections, Lyons (2004)
attributes the process of demilitarization before elections to be the success of El
Salvador in democratizing and establishing sustainable peace.
5.3.2 Strengthening civil society for greater political accountability
Civil society can provide positive contributions in fostering secure environments
for elections in a non-violent manner. Civil societies are volunteer groups and or-
ganizations representing local communities that are not affiliated with the state.
Since civil society is formed from members of the local community, its activism in
demanding political accountability from contending parties will have a long term
impact (Nilsson, 2012).
Explaining the role of civil society in Ghanaian election, for instance, Oduro
(2012) states that a key player in checking electoral violence in 2008 election was
the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO). Nine months prior to the
election day, local CODEO members were positioned in 56 selected constituencies
of the total 275. These observers acted as early warnings, drawing attention of all
the stakeholders to breaches and practices that undermined fairness and peace. In
addition to monthly reports from the CODEO, other civil society organizations, such
3International Crisis Group, 2 September 2015, Nepal: Conflict Alert. Kathmandu/Brussels:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/alerts/2015/nepal-conflict-alert.aspx ; Also see
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/opinion/slipping-backward-in-nepal.html
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as religious and professional bodies along with media, helped to identify electoral
wrongdoers and held them accountable publicly throughout the electoral time-
frame. Although Ghana in 2008 was not a post-conflict country, the example helps
to illustrate the watchdog role that civil society can play in warning against the use
of violence and intimidation by contending parties.
However, civil society in post-conflict countries may not be as active as in
the case of Ghana, which in 2008 was not a post-conflict country. Policy studies
suggest that an approach to build the culture of strong civil society in these contexts
is through a liaison with international NGOs. According to Forster and Mattner
(2007, p. 18), the impact of civil society monitoring activity is maximized by close
coordination among local, national and international actors. Therefore, initiating
and funding the creation of civil society organizations to monitor electoral fairness
at least one year before the election day is important. It is equally important to
make sure that reports from these organizations are disseminated to citizens, host-
nation governments, political parties, international organizations and international
communities.
5.4 Deployments of international election monitors at least six months prior
to the election
Countries holding first elections after the end of armed conflicts generally lack the
experience in democratic accountability mechanisms. Since false accusations of
electoral fraud can lead to protests, political power holders have incentives to in-
vite international election monitors to legitimize the electoral process. According to
Hyde and Marinov (2014), election reports by international election monitors pro-
vide information for citizens to protests credibly in cases of fraudulent elections, or,
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to deflate false-accusation protest. In this respect, election monitors can bolster the
civil society movement discussed above.
Regional and international non-governmental organizations, such as Orga-
nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and International Foun-
dation for Electoral System (IFES), frequently send election observers to monitor
elections in various countries. In her book about international election monitoring,
Kelley (2012) notes that the political power holders of countries started to welcome
the practice of external election monitoring because it provided the rulers legiti-
macy both externally and internally. By 2004, 85% of all non-established democ-
racies had some sort of election monitoring. However, based on her data from 108
countries from 1980 to 2004, the mean number of days that the first monitoring
delegations stay in an election-country is 24.21 (standard deviation 28.59) and the
mean number of people in the delegation is 28.9 (mode is 2). For the second mon-
itoring delegation, the mean number of days spent in the country drops to 3.92.
Typically, these delegation visits peak around the election day. Kelley’s data suggest
that the mean number of pre-election assessment visits is 0.57 (mode 0).
These results suggests that the focus of the monitoring bodies is on the main
election day, rather than the pre-election period. Kelley’s work also states that
monitors tend to have the tendency to under report pre-election violence, fearing
that reporting it might trigger violence and instability. She calls this the “stability
bias” (p. 73) among the monitors. This further suggests that election monitoring
is primarily done to assess the election quality in retrospect, rather than providing
contending parties an incentive to participate in elections fairly or imposing cost for
malpractices. In fact, the Declaration of Principles for International Election Obser-
vation endorsed by a core group of leading organizations like the Carter Center
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and the United Nations discourage election monitors to ask questions that might
obstruct the electoral process.4 While keeping in mind the political ramifications of
an overly interventionist agenda, a policy recommendation that follows the findings
of this study is that international election monitors in post-conflict elections must
raise costs for the indulgence in electoral malpractice by any party. Rather than
concluding in the aftermath whether or not an election was fair, a more construc-
tive approach would be to start the monitoring process right from the pre-election
period. As argued by Kelley (2009), interpreting what is a fair electoral practice
has been a subjective assessment, given the number of election monitoring orga-
nizations and their political agendas. Declaration of Principles and Carter Center’s
recently published election assessment manual is a good first step forward towards
creating objective oriented assessment standards (Carroll and Davis-Roberts, 2013).
This study contributes further by highlighting the need for a more focused assess-
ment criteria, especially in post-conflict countries where unfair electoral practices
during pre-election period can result not only in protests but the derailment of the
entire peace process.
5.4.1 Peacekeeping mandate to protect civilians before an election
Regional and international organizations deploy peacekeeping missions to post-
conflict countries often with the consent of warring parties. African Union missions
in Somalia and Darfur after 2009 are examples of such regional peacekeeping mis-
sions.5 The scope of international peacekeeping missions has shifted from tradi-
tional peacekeeping in inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflict or complex emer-
4See http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/declaration code english revised.pdf
[Accessed January 7, 2016]
5 United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is the first hybrid mission since
2009.
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gencies. Hultman (2010) argues that peacekeeping missions help to lower violence
levels overall, especially violence from government’s side. However, while the num-
ber of military clashes decrease after the deployment of peacekeeping troops, she
finds that rebel violence against civilians continues to increase. However, peace-
keeping missions with specific mandates to protect civilians are the exception.
Peacekeeping missions started to include a mandate to protect civilians since the
mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999. Holt and Taylor (2009, p. 3) state two
reasons for the need to include the protection of civilians clause in a peacekeeping
mission mandate. First, protecting civilians builds the legitimacy and credibility of
peacekeeping missions, as missions rely on local populace “to help build maintain
political momentum behind the peace process.” Second, deployment of peacekeep-
ers raises high expectations among locals that they will be protected. The authors
therefore mention that this mandate needs to be included as a political strategy to
build peace through its incorporation in various sub-tasks, such as monitoring and
advocating for human rights, supporting humanitarian access, enhancing effective
governance or rebuilding the rule of law, including organizing elections.6 As the
report further suggests, expectations in terms of protecting all civilians all the time
is too vague and unachievable. But the report falls short of in pointing the way
forward.
A high-level independent panel was formed in 2015 to make a comprehensive
assessment of the peace operations undertaken by the United Nations. The report
was presented to the 70th session of the General Assembly, in June 2015. One
of the areas of the assessment was a discussion on the protection of civilians in
peacekeeping operations. As noted above, peacekeeping mandates today invariably
6See p. 149 of the report in: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/446
[Accessed March 27, 2016]
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include human rights and protection-related clauses, which were absent prior to the
implementation of General Assembly resolution 60/1 on the 2005 World Summit
Outcomes. But the implementation part of the mandate—protecting civilians under
imminent threat—has been a challenge. One aspect of the challenge that the report
boldly highlights is the lack of “adequate infantry and enhanced mobility assets” in
UN missions (p. 39).
As Diehl and Druckman (2010) point out, evaluation of peacekeeping mis-
sions to maximize future efficiency and outcomes has been a continuous effort, but
the assessment technique has remained weak. The authors contribute by creating
an assessment template with several goals and indicators of success. They empha-
size the need to clearly articulate different dimensions of peacekeeping goals before
analyzing their measure of success. They provide three instances of conceptualizing
the interaction across the dimensions. First, a mission with more than one objec-
tive can be assessed by profiling that uses aggregate index of combined indicators.
This method can be used in evaluating the dual objective goals, such as for the mis-
sion in Sudan, which has characteristics of both inter-state and intra-state conflict.
Second, they show how each sub-goal can reinforce or offset the other sub-goals:
“Troop withdrawals are offset (or reinforced) by reluctance (or eagerness) to demo-
bilize and disarm” (p. 172). Third, they discuss the prioritization and sequencing
in peacekeeping missions. According to this line of thought, one sub-goal might
“trump” the other or may act as a pre-requisite for the other. For instance, violence
abatement may be a pre-requisite to conducting elections (p. 173).
However, the complexity and competing goals and sub-goals make it difficult
not only for academic scholars to assess, but also for practitioners on the ground
to operate. For example, in the absence of a clearly defined overarching goal, it is
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difficult to choose which competing goals to prioritize first since resources are al-
most always limited. In my own experience as a peacekeeper in Sudan in 2009, the
UNMIS headquarter faced a tough choice when the focus on disarming North and
South Sudanese combatants around the border to deescalate the tension between
the two was faced with a new scenario of inter-tribal fighting when members of
Nuer tribes attacked and killed at least 453 Murle tribe members in Jonglei state,
including many women and children, alleging that the latter raided their cattle in
January of that year.7 The mission established UN bases in the affected Pibor and
Akobo counties, each with 120 UN peacekeepers.8 This is a positive example where
the UN was able to divert its resources in reaction to civilian insecurity, despite the
initial loss. But without a clear set of priorities, unforeseen events like these on the
ground can easily divert attention and resources from the main goal.
I propose that better results could be achieved with a reasonably focused goal
of civilian protection geared towards establishing free, fair and peaceful elections.
As discussed in the beginning chapter, elections in post-conflict countries are often
the foundational political institution. Electing a party in a free and fair atmosphere
not only provides legitimacy for the party, but also kick-starts a political process that
has higher accountability, thus avoiding what some scholars refer to as the lower
form accountability traps (Ashworth, de Mesquita and Friedenberg, 2015). Current
practices of broad civilian protection mandates can also force UN missions to deploy
in pursuit of local security, which can portray external peacekeepers negatively as
encroaching upon the host nation’s area of responsibility and even cultivating the
dependency culture. Instead, civilian protection mandates specific to the task of cre-
7See http://af.reuters.com/article/sudanNews/idAFLN29719920090923 [Accessed December
20, 2015]
8See UN report available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2009.pdf
[Accessed December 20, 2015]
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ating safe elections are more focused and more effective in generating sustainable
peace later, and also for delineating a clearer exit strategy for the peacekeepers.
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